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ABSTRACT
This study examines the monitor, a court-appointed officer under the Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act, in order to determine whether and how to best secure its independence.
Concerns over the role are increasingly over whether it can maintain its supposed impartiality and
avoid conflicts of interest. This study centers on its fiduciary duty, long discussed in the courts, as
both problematic because it is not conclusively defined, and as the best means of establishing the
monitor as a fair and impartial guardian of public confidence in Canadian insolvency law. By
examining leading insolvency law theories, international and Canadian insolvency policy, and then
the CCAA and insolvency and fiduciary caselaw, this study proposes codification of the monitor’s
fiduciary duty. The monitor’s fiduciary duty remains an underexplored concept in the literature,
and this study proposes clarification and certainty for that duty through its addition to the CCAA.
Keywords: bankruptcy, CCAA, collective action problem, creditors, fiduciary, insolvency,
monitor.
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SUMMARY FOR LAY AUDIENCE
When large companies find themselves close to being unable to continue paying their
creditors, they may consider restructuring their business, usually by selling off parts of it, to return
to financial stability. In Canada, the legislation most used for this is the Companies’ Creditors
Arrangement Act, 1985 (CCAA). This Act provides the mechanics for a successful restructuring,
i.e. for a debtor company to reach a compromise with its creditors under a court’s supervision. It
is required that the court appoint a monitor, an officer that acts as impartial information
intermediary between all interested parties, advising the debtor company and the court during the
restructuring. The monitor is supposed to be independent of the parties, in that it is not supposed
to favour any one party. The role is often referred to as that of an impartial watchdog, ensuring the
debtor company adheres to what is required of it, and keeping the interested parties and the court
updated during the proceedings. Yet the role is often placed in situations where it may have a
previous or ongoing relationship with some of the parties, and may act in a way that is perceived
as preferring a particular party’s position.
The present study deals with one aspect of the monitor that has not been satisfactorily
defined: its fiduciary duty. A fiduciary duty means that one party, the fiduciary, is to act in the best
interests of the party to whom it owes the duty, with the utmost diligence, good faith, and loyalty.
Since the monitor was first created by courts, it was held to owe a fiduciary duty to all of the parties
to the CCAA process. This has never been conclusively determined by the Supreme Court of
Canada, or by Parliament. This study seeks not only to clarify whether the monitor is a fiduciary,
but to anchor its status as fiduciary by proposing that its fiduciary duty be added to the CCAA.
The study argues that inclusion of the monitor’s fiduciary duty in the legislation will protect its
independence, clarify its role, and lead to a fairer process.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
There is no shortage of scholarly debate over the proper purpose of bankruptcy and
insolvency law.1 This Chapter examines the foundational concepts and theories from which stem
common understandings of insolvency law. Part I considers major scholarly theories of the
purposes and functions of bankruptcy and insolvency law. Part II considers how insolvency policy
guides, written by international bodies, themselves influential upon domestic legislation, reflect
such theories. Part III considers the relevance of these theories to proceedings under Canada’s
main corporate restructuring statute: the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA).2 Part
IV provides a concluding summary and introduces the next Chapter.
The Supreme Court of Canada has summarized the purpose of the CCAA as being: “to
permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and
economic costs of liquidating its assets.”3 A decade later, the Court expanded on this statement,
holding that the CCAA’s objectives are simultaneously to maximize creditor recovery, protect the
going-concern value of the debtor company, safeguard as best as possible the socioeconomic
interests of employees and affected communities, and act as a bulwark of the credit system. 4 An
examination of insolvency theory is helpful to understanding not only Canadian restructuring
practice, but also the CCAA’s stated policy goals. The CCAA pursues its objectives by, among
other things, imbuing judges with broad discretionary powers, to be exercised in their supervisory

The terms ‘bankruptcy and insolvency law’, ‘bankruptcy law’, and ‘insolvency law’ will be used interchangeably,
to refer to the body of law that deals with companies who are or will soon be unable to pay debts as they become due.
See e.g., Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada, “Bankruptcy and Insolvency at a Glance” (2 December
2015), online:<www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/h_br01545.html>.
2
RSC 1985, c C-36.
3
Century Services v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 60 at para 15 [Century Services].
4
9354-9186 Québec inc v Callidus Capital Corp, 2020 SCC 10 at para 42 [Callidus], citing Janis Sarra. Rescue!: The
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 14 [Sarra, “Rescue”].
1
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role in CCAA cases.5 In this unique supervisory capacity,6 CCAA judges are assisted by the courtappointed monitor.7 The role of the monitor, a court-appointed officer that serves as information
intermediary, tasked with keeping creditors apprised of the financial condition of the debtor, 8 is
crucial to the court’s analysis of the parties’ restructuring proposals.9 Importantly, the monitor
owes a fiduciary duty to all parties– it is obligated to act in the best interest of all parties to the
proceedings.10 It is in order to determine whether and to what extent the monitor’s duty conflicts
with the practice of insolvency law under the CCAA that this Chapter returns to first principles,
(that is, insolvency theory and policy). The monitor’s role can only be properly examined with a
clear understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of its governing legislation.
My proposal is that the monitor’s fiduciary duty, as understood in the jurisprudence, be
codified in the CCAA as a fiduciary duty to the process, ensuring the fairness of the process in the
pursuit of the CCAA’s objectives. The function of this Chapter in the overall thesis is to identify
the core principles and theories underlying insolvency law. From this foundation, Chapter Two
will then narrow the focus onto the monitor, its duties, and its role within the CCAA regime.
Chapter Three examines fiduciary law in Canada and the monitor’ status as a fiduciary, drawing
comparisons between the monitor and other fiduciaries in Canadian corporate and insolvency law.
It concludes with my proposal for codification of the monitor’s twofold fiduciary duty, namely, to
act in the best interests of the collective of stakeholders in the restructuring and to ensure that the

5

Callidus, ibid at paras 47, 48, citing Century Services, supra note 3 at para 58.
Callidus, ibid at para 47.
7
Ibid at para 52.
8
See e.g., Janis Sarra, Creditor Rights and the Public Interest, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) at 26
[Sarra, “Creditor Rights”]; Richard H McLaren, Canadian Commercial Reorganization: Preventing Bankruptcy,
(Aurora, Ont: Canada Law Book, 1994) ch 1 at para 1.2900; Roderick J Wood, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law,
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2015) at 317 [Wood, “Bankruptcy”].
9
Callidus, supra note 4 at para 52.
10
Wood, “Bankruptcy”, ibid; Winalta Inc (Re), 2011 ABQB 399 [Winalta] at para 67 (“[a] monitor owes a fiduciary
duty to the stakeholders; is required to account to the court; is to act independently; and must treat all parties reasonably
and fairly, including creditors, the debtor and its shareholders” ibid).
6
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process is fair. Chapter Four concludes the thesis by providing the proposed language for codifying
this fiduciary duty and addressing objections to my proposal.
The practice of insolvency law seems, at times, to be at odds with insolvency theory. The
key takeaway of Chapter One is that theory and policy only tell part of the story. In order to fully
grasp the mechanics of the CCAA, this Chapter undertakes an historical analysis of the CCAA.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Century Services recognized that “incremental exercise of
judicial discretion” has been the driving force in the evolution of the CCAA.” 11 Further analysis
reveals that secured creditors have provided much of the impetus for the inception and evolution
of the CCAA, on an ad hoc basis through the courts. Understood in this way, the numerous
insolvency theories reflected in the policy guides, and throughout the CCAA, are revealed often
to reflect secured creditors’ interests. Where the CCAA seems to favour other parties, these
concessions operate to assuage the overt influence that secured creditors have over the legislative
and judicial process of CCAA lawmaking. However, CCAA courts are most concerned with
fairness, and therein lies the balance to be struck between powerful players—such as secured
creditors—and other stakeholders in the process.12 Accordingly, to the extent that secured creditors
are so favoured, we should expect to see at least some disconnect between the CCAA’s (judicially)
stated objectives and the monitor’s role in carrying out its duties in practice.

Supra note 3 at para 58; See also Dylex Ltd (Re) (1995), 31 CBR (3d) 106 (Ont Ct (Gen Div)) (“[t]he history of
CCAA law has been an evolution of judicial interpretation” Dylex, ibid at para 10).
12
Callidus, ibid at para 51 (“[t]he procedures set out in the CCAA rely on negotiations and compromise between the
debtor and its stakeholders, as overseen by the supervising judge and the monitor… [which] requires that, to the extent
possible, those involved in the proceedings be on equal footing and have a clear understanding of their respective
rights” ibid).
11
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PART I – INSOLVENCY THEORY
Bankruptcy and insolvency law is unique not for its ability to readjust the entitlements born
of other areas of the law, but because it can extinguish such entitlements entirely.13 It is because
of this feature of insolvency law that scholars have long debated what the purpose and function of
insolvency law ought to be. One prominent author clarifies that:
[i]n common law jurisdictions, it is now well established that bankruptcy law serves three
principal functions: (1) to solve the “collective action problem” discouraging creditors
from collaborating outside of bankruptcy and to provide a mechanism in bankruptcy
legislation for the orderly liquidation of a bankrupt’s estate and distribution of the proceeds
among the creditors; (2) to enable basically viable enterprises to reorganize themselves to
allow them to stay in business; and (3) to enable overextended debtors to make a “fresh
start” by surrendering their non-exempt assets and obtaining a discharge for the balance of
their debts.14

Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is still some tension regarding the importance to be afforded
to each of these functions. Accordingly, this Part will first examine scholarly debate regarding the
theoretical underpinnings of bankruptcy and insolvency law.
(i) Creditors’ Bargain Theory (CBT)
Most modern debates over the purposes of bankruptcy and insolvency law can be traced to
the CBT, formulated by Thomas Jackson in the 1980s.15 CBT sees “bankruptcy as a system
designed to mirror the agreement one would expect the creditors to form among themselves were
they able to negotiate such an agreement from an ex ante position.”16 The goal is to overcome the
“collective action problem,” that arises where creditors act on a narrowly self-interested basis,
individually seeking to collect on their claims.17 Without a mechanism for coordinating their

See e.g., Elizabeth Warren, “Bankruptcy Policy” (1987) 54:3 U Chicago L Rev 775 at 784–85 [Warren,
“Bankruptcy”].
14
Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Thomas G W Telfer, eds, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law in Canada: Cases, Materials, and
Problems (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2019) at 22.
15
Thomas H Jackson, “Bankruptcy, Nonbankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain” (1982) 91:5 Yale LJ
857.
16
Ibid at 861.
17
Ibid at 862.
13
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collection efforts, the creditors are trapped in a collective action problem, each individually racing
to collect from their mutual debtor before the other creditors can do likewise.18 This race destroys
the going concern value of the debtor’s business, depleting the pool of assets available to the
creditors as a group. CBT sets out how bankruptcy law solves this problem. Jackson’s account
begins with a recognition of pre-existing, nonbankruptcy entitlements.19 Jackson rejects a view of
bankruptcy that is aimed solely at “relieving an overburdened debtor from ‘oppressive’ debt.”20
Instead, Jackson sees bankruptcy as “[a] collective system that treats all claimants standing in the
same relationship to the debtor alike… [and that provides] a sum “certain” for the uncertain amount
that might be realized under an individualistic creditors' remedy system.”21 In other words, Jackson
argues that bankruptcy law should be geared towards lowering the creditors’ collection costs,22
thereby maximizing the value of the pool of assets available to them.23
Importantly, CBT is supposed to effect “a net benefit: the secured creditor would be no
worse off than before and the unsecured creditors could be made better off.” 24 This focus on
efficiency for all parties works because by respecting nonbankruptcy entitlements—especially
those of secured creditors—the cost of collection is lowered, and unsecured creditors benefit
without having a detrimental effect on secured creditor claims.25 Jackson’s reasoning here is that
secured creditors “would have no reason to object to such an inclusion if left as well off as

18

Ibid.
Ibid at 858.
20
Ibid at 857.
21
Ibid at 861 [footnotes omitted].
22
Ibid at 869.
23
Ibid at 865 (“the total pool of assets available to satisfy their claims may be increased through collective action…
[so] one would expect them to agree to a collective system that deterred the sub-optimal behavior of the prisoner's
dilemma, and… to capture and share the "going concern" value of D's business” ibid).
24
Ibid at 870.
25
Ibid at 869–70 (secured creditors’ collection costs, when acting unilaterally, are passed on to the debtor, which
“would increase the secured creditor's claim… [and] pro tanto, reduce the pool of assets available for the unsecured
creditors and thereby increase their costs of credit” ibid at 869).
19
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before.”26 Moreover the cost of the—secured and unsecured—creditors’ positions in a prebankruptcy scenario are already factored in, given that secured creditors accept reduced interest
payments in exchange for an increased chance of repayment, while unsecured creditors receive the
reverse.27
Suspicious of attempts to circumvent nonbankruptcy entitlements, Jackson argues that the
bankruptcy process is best reserved for complex situations that are unlikely to be resolved
informally, that is, by private negotiation among the debtor and its creditors.28 Such situations
typically arise when there are large numbers of creditors. 29 Corporate debtors will typically have
a constantly changing and growing group of creditors, 30 which is difficult to track and increases
the cost of negotiations while decreasing the likelihood of a consensual agreement.31 Nonetheless,
Jackson’s emphasis on preserving nonbankruptcy entitlements is the foundation of CBT:
[t]he presence of a bankruptcy system does not mandate its use. The realization that a
creditor could always initiate the bankruptcy process would deter attempts in any
nonbankruptcy collective proceeding to provide any creditor with less than the minimum
obtainable in a bankruptcy proceeding. The availability of a mandatory collective system
in which distributions are governed by a set of statutory rules is, therefore, important
because it stipulates a minimum set of entitlements for claimants that, in turn, provides a
framework for implementing a consensual collective proceeding outside of the bankruptcy
process.32

26

Ibid at 870 [emphasis in original].
Ibid at 871 (“a secured creditor has already "paid" for this prior entitlement- really a higher probability of being
repaid-through receipt of a lower return… [while] unsecured creditors have already been "paid" for allowing this prior
entitlement and they receive a higher rate of return because of their lower priority [footnotes omitted]” ibid).
28
Ibid at 860 (this would seem to suggest that in situations of financial distress absent the difficulties that precipitate
the collective action problem, Jackson would proceed with informal resolution; see above discussion cited to note 25
for Jackson’s detailed explanation).
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid at 866–67.
31
Ibid (“the creditors themselves cannot be expected to negotiate this agreement, even though it would be in their
joint interest to do so… [so this is where a] federal bankruptcy rule [steps in to provide a] mandatory collective system
after insolvency has occurred” ibid).
32
Ibid at 867 [footnotes omitted].
27
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In Jackson’s view, the justification for the formal bankruptcy regime is that it maximizes the value
of the assets available to the creditors.33 Bankruptcy, therefore, is a mechanism for vindicating the
individual self-interest of creditors, which is done by resolving the collective action problem by
which individual action would destroy value for the group. This is most evident from Jackson’s
consideration of the distinction between reorganization (i.e., restructuring)34 and liquidation. He
notes that so long as the principal objective or result is one where the pool of debtor assets is
augmented, it does not matter whether bankruptcy leads to restructuring or liquidation.35 As will
be discussed in the later section on the CCAA, the question of whether to restructure or liquidate
a debtor can be controversial. For Jackson, these concepts are one and the same, in that
“reorganization, at least as a start, may be viewed as a form of liquidation… [where the debtor
business is] sold to the creditors themselves rather than to third parties.”36 Both avenues serve the
same purpose vis-à-vis generating returns for the creditors.37 In short, creditors will prefer a
reorganization where they expect it to generate greater returns for them than a liquidation—in such
cases, in effect, the existing creditors are buying their debtor’s business rather than selling it to a
third party buyer because it is worth more to them than to any third party. Jackson’s only caveat is
that liquidation lends itself more easily to direct satisfaction of nonbankruptcy entitlements/claims,
whereas reorganization produces difficult valuation of the same payments.38 Jackson’s view is that

33

It would be a stretch to say this is the sole purpose, as insolvency law also serves to resolve the collective action
problem, which is also a principal function.
34
The terms reorganization and restructuring will be used interchangeably throughout and are terms of art in Canadian
law which are not defined in any statute.
35
Jackson, supra note 15 at 864.
36
Ibid at 893 [footnotes omitted].
37
Ibid at 895 (“[w]hether the process be a piecemeal liquidation, a going concern liquidation (i.e., a sale of the entity
to a third party), or a reorganization liquidation (i.e., a sale of the entity to the creditors), nothing in the form of the
process seems to call for a different standard of allocation among claims (the second step) in one type of proceeding
than in another” ibid).
38
Ibid at 894 (“[i]n a reorganization, however, the proceeds from the "sale" out of which claims against the debtor
will be paid will consist principally of new claims against the same enterprise… [making] the valuation of the payment
to the claimants substantially more difficult” ibid).
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insolvency law’s compulsory, collective process resolves the collective action problem by
imposing a stay on individual creditor actions. This makes it possible for the creditors to
collectively pursue a value-maximizing outcome. Ultimately, Jackson’s commitment to upholding
pre-existing, nonbankruptcy entitlements produces a theory that views insolvency law as a helpful
supplement to an established body of nonbankruptcy law, and whose main function is creditor
wealth maximization.
(ii) Loss Distribution Theory (LDT)
Jackson’s CBT focuses on addressing the policy goal of maximizing creditor recovery,
which Elizabeth Warren views as a major shortcoming because it is too narrow of a policy goal.39
For Warren, insolvency law is “an attempt to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and to
distribute the consequences among a number of different actors.”40 Warren sees distribution
concerns as fundamental to insolvency law. Her approach, LDT, considers that there are multiple
policy concerns and values, none of which reigns supreme, which are reflected in the way that
insolvency law distributes the losses flowing from the debtor’s insolvency among its different
stakeholders.41 Put another way, LDT departs from CBT’s narrow search for maximizing value,
into a wider search for an optimal compromise between competing claims against a limited pool
of assets.42 The policy of ensuring fairness and protecting the vulnerable is taken in LDT to be a
necessary goal of insolvency law, evidenced by consistent comments from legislators and courts
about safeguarding the average investor and offering protection for employees and businesses

Warren, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 13 (“the policies endorsed to support bankruptcy pronouncements are… asserted
only obliquely, and they are rarely challenged directly” ibid at 776).
40
Ibid at 777.
41
Ibid; The term ‘stakeholder’ will be used to refer to all interested parties in a bankruptcy, whether creditor or noncreditor.
42
“[d]iscussing the debtor-creditor system is much like focusing a camera… depending on where the focus is directed,
different features of the system take on greater importance” ibid at 778.
39
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alike.43 For Warren, “[t]hese comments serve as reminders that Congress intended bankruptcy law
to address concerns broader than the immediate problems of debtors and their identified
creditors.”44
Like Jackson, Warren is cognizant of the self-interested, survival mindset of the actors in
insolvency law.45 That is, she also recognizes that bankruptcy is very much “creditor-versuscreditor, with competing creditors struggling to push the losses of default onto others.”46 Contrary
to Jackson, Warren’s LDT focuses on distribution—both of losses and payments—as its central
tenet, surpassing value maximization and the primacy of pre-existing entitlements.47 As for the
former, by its very nature the distribution of losses is an attempt to compromise claims in a way
that looks beyond maximizing value, and towards spreading the consequences that led to default
with a view to preserving the business.48 This view necessarily favours reorganization to
liquidation; it seeks to end up with the debtor emerging from the process with a viable ongoing
business. On the latter point of the primacy of nonbankruptcy entitlements, Warren is highly
critical of any hard and fast predetermination of winners and losers that unreasonably leaves the
most vulnerable49 stakeholders to bear the brunt of the losses.50 What this means is that creditors,
along with a broader community of stakeholders, will have to “defer some collection rights… in
order to give the debtor an opportunity to continue as a viable business.”51

Ibid at 788 (Warren’s discussion solely encompasses the American system, however her points find direct parallels
in Canada, as will be explored in the later section on the CCAA).
44
Ibid.
45
I.e. for every actor that gains, one or more actors have to suffer a loss, leading to a zero-sum game.
46
Warren, “Bankruptcy”, supra note 13 at 785.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid at 787–88.
49
See ibid at 786–88, 793 (Warren gives examples of several vulnerable groups: future tort claimants, customers,
suppliers, employees, etc.).
50
Ibid (“Congress… accepted the idea that bankruptcy serves to protect interests that have no other protection… [such
as t]he older employee, the regular customer, the dependent supplier, and the local community… regardless of whether
they have rights recognized at state law” ibid at 788).
51
Ibid at 789.
43
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LDT’s focus on distribution centres around the individual self-interested creditor, given
that even in the absence of insolvency law, creditors will seek to collect.52 This inherent quality of
bankruptcy and insolvency necessitates, for Warren, the policy considerations underscored in
LDT. The fact that stakeholders are faced “with an inadequate pie to divide and the looming
discharge of unpaid debts,”53 means that care must be taken during the fight over slices of the pie
to not overlook:
inquiries into many issues, including who may be hurt by a business failure, how they may
be hurt, whether the hurt can be avoided, at what cost it can be avoided, who is helped by
the business failure, whether aid to those helped offsets the injury to those hurt, who can
efficiently evaluate the risks of business failure, who may have contributed to the business
failure, how they may have contributed, whether the contribution to failure serves other
useful goals, who can best bear the costs of business failure, and who expected to bear the
costs of business failure-just to name a few.54

Warren’s conception thus leans towards public interest and away from the more law and
economics approach preferred by CBT theorists. Warren’s camp worries over not leaving any
hungry mouths now, whilst Jackson’s approach slices the pie based on previously placed orders of
pie slices. In more technical terms, LDT seeks to set out an effective scheme, alleviating the
negative consequences of distributional choices on certain vulnerable groups.
(iii) Baird’s Reply to Warren: Resuscitating the CBT
Jackson and Warren represent opposing sides of insolvency law theory. The third voice in
this debate, Douglas Baird,55 attempts to restate CBT in response to Warren’s criticisms. Baird’s
conception of insolvency law is that it: “is a procedure in which the actions of those with rights to
the assets of a firm are stayed and the affairs of the firm are sorted out in an orderly way.”56 Baird,

Ibid at 790 (“[e]ven if there were no legal scheme to distribute the costs of default, the losses would be distributed…
[whether] by creditor speed (who first backs up to the warehouse with big trucks) or strength (who can carry away the
most while others look on) or by debtor favoritism (who gets the first call when the debtor decides to give up” ibid.)
53
Ibid at 785.
54
Ibid at 796.
55
“Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren” (1987) 54:3 U Chicago L Rev 815.
56
Ibid at 824.
52
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like Jackson, stresses that insolvency law provides an alternative debt-collection process, running
parallel to existing nonbankruptcy entitlements, in a situation involving multiple actors’ rights.57
The main difference between Warren’s approach and that of Jackson and Baird is that the latter
pair believe the distribution of losses is a question addressed outside of bankruptcy law, while the
former believes this is the core issue in insolvency law.58
This is well-illustrated in Baird’s consideration of secured creditor rights and noncreditor
rights. For secured creditors, “[t]he idea is not to give them a good deal, but rather to approximate
the same deal that they had outside of bankruptcy so that no one has an incentive to begin a
bankruptcy proceeding simply because its distributional rule is different.”59 Accordingly, if
changes need to be made to the nonbankruptcy rights of secured creditors, that is precisely where
they should be made: in nonbankruptcy law.60 As for noncreditors—and this reasoning applies to
the wider array of stakeholders envisioned by Warren—Baird states that “[o]ne cannot say that
bankruptcy is necessary to protect those without legally cognizable interests without first
answering the question of why these individuals cannot be given such interests.”61 In other words,
insolvency law does not operate to create rights but to procedurally employ existing nonbankruptcy
rights.62 Baird’s reasoning is that if a stakeholder group is granted rights in bankruptcy that it
would not otherwise have, this creates a perverse incentive for such a group to pursue bankruptcy,

57

Ibid.
Ibid at 815–16 (“[t]he issue, it must be noted, is not how losses from a firm failure should be distributed, but whether
this question (however hard it may be to answer) is a question of the law generally (as Jackson and I would argue) or
one peculiar to bankruptcy law (as Warren would argue)” ibid at 816).
59
Ibid at 832.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid at 828.
62
Ibid at 827 (“existing bankruptcy law does not set substantive rights and its procedural rights can be understood
only against the background of nonbankruptcy procedural rights” ibid).
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and for opposing parties to avoid same, resulting in forum shopping.63 Warren’s suggestion that
such parties be protected is thus a question that, for Baird, should be addressed outside of
insolvency law, lest there be disparity between the two forums of debt-collection that results in
increased costs.64 Baird summarizes this as follows:
Warren thinks that the benefits of bankruptcy justify additional burdens on creditors. But
the issue is not whether the burdens on creditors in bankruptcy are just, but whether the
burdens should exist only in bankruptcy. Creditors enjoy the benefits of the nonbankruptcy
debt collection system as well. Why should they not have to take the rights of workers into
account when they use that system? More to the point, taxing creditors differently
depending on which enforcement mechanism they use invites troublesome forum
shopping.65

CBT’s view is that while the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy debt collection mechanisms
operate as an alternative to each other, this does not impose more or less importance on either
method.66 Baird also clarifies that CBT’s emphasis on pre-existing nonbankruptcy entitlements
does not “assume that whatever priorities are created under nonbankruptcy law are right.”67 CBT’s
acceptance of the parallel nature of these systems rests on their ability to resolve the collective
action problem.68 Importantly, the option of insolvency law does not imply a “reason for
reassessing relative entitlements.”69 This brings the argument back full circle to the question of
rights, which Baird reasserts is one that is best answered by upholding nonbankruptcy entitlements,
and not of manufacturing fresh rights from insolvency law.70 Take the example of the rights of
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secured creditors, consistently referenced because they are the party with the strongest position in
debt collection proceedings. Such creditors have a predetermined priority right, which allows them
“a place in line; and having a place in line matters largely because some people may be shut out.”71
This is the very thing that LDT seeks to avoid, by its focus on a fair and reasonable
distribution of losses.72 That is, as we observed in the previous section, Warren’s conception of
insolvency law is premised on a policy of encouraging the continuance of a debtor’s business. 73
Baird takes issue with this, noting that not only does CBT purposefully avoid the question of which
parties should endure losses,74 but it also respects that “ownership of the firm is a question quite
distinct from its survival.”75 This harkens back to recognition of creditors’ self-interest and
autonomy, but reformulates it to state that if the collective interest of creditors, as a “united front”
is to shutter the business, then it is their prerogative to do so, whether inside of insolvency law or
not.76 Moreover, the ownership interests, most of which are stayed in insolvency law, do not bear
on how the assets to which those rights are attached are used, or whether the business as a whole
continues to operate.77 Put simply, LDT’s understanding of insolvency law as inherently seeking
to keep a debtor’s business going in spite of the wishes of a majority of creditors eschews law for
policy preference, and does nothing to justify the use of insolvency law to achieve such an end. 78
Baird is clear that default does not imply a bankruptcy scenario, anymore than it implies a business
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has failed.79 Shifting resources to ensure claims are upheld will always benefit some to the
detriment of others.80 What is crucial, is to understand that the above is the justification for the two
possible paths to debt collection: “it is because default does not always raise a collective problem
that there are two avenues… [wherein] bankruptcy's avenue of enforcement springs from the
collective action problem.”81
This again leads to the premise of the separation of insolvency law and nonbankruptcy
issues upon which rests the foundation for CBT. In an attempt to ascribe to insolvency law that
which is not unique to or even a component of it, e.g., loss distribution,82 noncreditor protection,83
etc., “one simply talks about social policy generally.”84 This is not to say that CBT is cold and
heartless. Baird is careful to assert that vulnerable parties, such as retiring employees, are not
afforded adequate rights, and that this merits changes in existing nonbankruptcy laws dealing with
such topics.85 His point—and Jackson’s—as has been shown throughout, is merely that this
problem should not find its solution in insolvency law.86 It should find its solution in legislating
outside of insolvency law to address such apparent shortcomings.
(iv) Reshaping CBT: The Authentic Consent Model (ACM)
Rizwaan Mokal offers what can be considered an alternate version of CBT: the ACM.87
He contends that CBT contains an essential flaw that undermines its stated goal. Specifically, CBT
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states that when creditors negotiate their hypothetical bargain ex ante, that is, prior to the debtor’s
bankruptcy, they do so from behind a veil of ignorance. That is, the creditors do not know what
relative position they will occupy—what their relative strengths and weaknesses will be—if their
debtor becomes bankrupt. Consequently, the creditors can negotiate for a set of bankruptcy
procedures that all of them would agree are fair: “since creditors do not know how well-placed
they would be to race for the debtor's assets, they cannot bias the selection process so as to produce
principles favouring them at the expense of others.”88 Mokal, however, points out that creditors in
the real world are surely aware of their strength/leverage relative to other creditors, even if they
cannot predict the outcomes of any particular transaction.89 Creditors with such knowledge would
thus not agree with each other ex ante, and would likely also renege on any such deal, changing
positions in subsequent transactions, as their circumstances change relative to other parties.90 The
result is that strong creditors have no reason to concede their position and would insist on having
priority within the hierarchical ranking of creditors in bankruptcy.91 Mokal considers that Jackson
may have conceived of the collective proceeding as still being worthwhile for stronger creditors
because it addresses the fact that the race to collect increases costs for all creditors, and provides
them with a “relative certainty of ranking pari passu.”92 However, Mokal considers these
insufficient defences for CBT, in that they still fall short of incorporating the varying strengths of
different creditors, and their respective knowledge thereof.93 Mokal’s position essentially “points
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up the fact that Jackson's model merely reflects, and does not correct for, the relative inequalities
of the creditors at an arbitrary point in time.”94
The answer to this problem is to “deprive the creditors of the Creditors’ Bargain of any
knowledge of who they are.”95 Basically, Mokal suggests that the uncertainty of how a creditor’s
position may change once its debtor becomes insolvent necessitates a consideration of all possible
interests which they may turn out to hold.96 While creditors are aware of their current capabilities
relative to other parties, they cannot confidently discern whether their position will be better if
they move unilaterally, or collectively.97 For this reason, they would necessarily consider the
implications of participating in the collective regime.98 Moreover, “the type of creditor who could
do better without a stay is precisely the sort best able to cope with the effects of the stay if it is
imposed.”99 ACM recognizes that the strongest players can calculate the effects of insolvency into
their initial lending, thus making them able to subsume any negative effects of collective
proceedings.100 This means that a creditor, regardless of strength, may agree to a smaller asset pool
through the collective regime, if such regime eliminates the possibility that they will turn out to be
on the losing side of debt collection.101
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Importantly, like CBT, Mokal also stipulates that “[s]imply because an issue can “arise in
insolvency” does not by itself mean it should be dealt with by insolvency law.”102 However, he
notes that ACM takes a broader view than CBT, insofar as it does not limit “participation in the ex
ante agreement to those who have contracted for legal rights to the debtor’s assets once insolvency
has occurred.”103 He does not significantly expand on these comments, noting only that a direct
financial interest should not be the only prerequisite for consideration under insolvency law.104
The ACM is also criticized for reaching the same policy position as CBT, or otherwise of
suggesting a result which can be reached by using CBT.105 For example, ACM focuses on
reciprocity over self-interest, however Mokal seems to “blur the distinction… [where,] [a]t the
level of application, reciprocity starts to look very like a proxy for long-term self interest relative
to short-term self-interest.”106 Mokal’s response to this criticism is to highlight the difference
between CBT’s contractarian nature and ACM’s contractualist approach, whereby “the ACM is
a ‘justice as reciprocity’ rather than a ‘justice as mutual advantage’ theory.”107 ACM’s
contractualist approach “designs its ‘choice position’,”108 and thus once in the choice position,
“parties are assumed to be motivated by rational self-interest alone.”109 In the choice position, the
parties may strategize out of self-interest, but reciprocity is already assured by their necessary
accounting for the possibility that they might turn out to hold some unfortunate position.110
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(v) Conclusions Regarding CBT and LDT
From the above theoretical debate, we can draw the following conclusions regarding the
purposes of insolvency law. First, insolvency law may be thought of as a means of solving the
collective action problem that arises when creditors race to enforce their claims individually and
thereby destroy the value of a common pool of assets. Insolvency law solves this problem by
imposing a collective resolution process on all creditors. This is the key purpose of insolvency law
according to CBT. This theory further contends that the sole purpose of insolvency law should be
to maximize the value of the assets available to the bankrupt’s creditors, leaving other concerns,
e.g., broader socioeconomic considerations, for legislatures to address. So long as insolvency law
respects nonbankruptcy entitlement—reflecting the hypothetical bargain that creditors would have
struck ex ante acting in their individual self-interest—then insolvency is not an intrusion into the
private, contractual rights of creditors. ACM departs from CBT here,111 stating that it is necessary
that creditors anticipate that they could turn out to be in a winning or losing position in insolvency,
and for that reason, agree to the collective proceeding. Importantly, the CBT approach does not
concern itself with the effects or consequences that stem from bankruptcy (i.e. socioeconomic
implications). It merely situates itself in the pre-bankruptcy past, discerns economic rights, then
travels to the bankruptcy present, and distributes claims so as to best respect said prior entitlements.
On the other hand, insolvency law may be thought of as a means of dealing with losses. It
directs itself to the most reasonable distribution possible of the consequences of the debtor’s
inability to pay. This is the LDT side of the coin. From this perspective, insolvency law should not
be so narrowly confined to money value and profit. Rather, insolvency law can properly direct
itself to maximizing value, only if in doing so it also accounts for the vulnerability of a broader
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array of stakeholders, impacted by the debtor’s bankruptcy. Accordingly, insolvency law can be
best defined as a means of redistributing losses so that no one group, or groups is unfairly
overburdened.
A few criticisms are worth mentioning. Not all firms that fail actually enter bankruptcy
proceedings112 (and vice versa),113 which raises the question: why should insolvency law seek to
ascribe priority rights to vulnerable groups in one situation but not in the other?114 This casts doubt
on the scope of the vulnerability analysis of LDT, though it does not dispel the notion that such an
analysis could be important. On another note, CBT is premised on an ex ante—i.e., forecasting a
potential—scenario where creditors are either all ‘alike’,115 or at least ignorant of what their
creditor status will be in a bankruptcy scenario. This means the fairness of the insolvency law
system, under CBT, hinges on equality between the parties, which is at best an extremely unlikely
set of circumstances, as pointed out by the ACM. Therefore, if creditors are not on equal footing,
their self-interest will be to protect the degree to which they are exposed to risk, further polarizing
strong and weak creditors. In a negotiation among creditors of unequal leverage, one would expect
those with the most leverage to wield it to obtain the most favourable terms.
One takeaway from the foregoing debates is that insolvency law is primarily focused on
economic rights. Arguably, this supports the view of the CBT that the primary goal of insolvency
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law should be creditor wealth maximization. Nonetheless, to focus solely thereon is perhaps too
narrow of a construction, and so an analysis of vulnerability should follow. Ultimately then, the
question is whether insolvency law should include a more thorough consideration of vulnerable
parties, or whether the proper solution is for legislatures to address these concerns outside of
insolvency law. In short, value maximization as a singular focus is too narrow, and too large a
focus on distribution of losses—for example on redistribution—is anathema to the effective
satisfaction of claims stemming from fairly obtained economic rights.116 What is perhaps most
important, is that insolvency law provide a forum where strong and weak players alike are able to
voice their opinions,117 and which fairly reflects their strengths and weaknesses.118
As may be evident from the foregoing, the principal tension is over how wide of a net to
cast when determining the alleviatory effects insolvency law should have on stakeholders of a
debtor. This is still an ongoing discussion, which, as will be seen below, continues to polarize
theorists.
(vi) Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization (TPT)
One counter to CBT is the TPT, by Lynn LoPucki.119 This theory is greatly influenced by
Warren’s LDT, in that it recognizes and seeks to address the interests of the broader groups making
up creditor and noncreditor stakeholders of the debtor, with the goal of keeping the business
operating.120 Whereas CBT is premised on a hypothetical agreement between creditors from an ex
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ante position, TPT centres “on the actual contracts entered into by team members,”121 which are
defined as “all who make firm-specific investments but are unable to protect those investments by
direct contracting, personal trust, or reputation.”122 TPT depends on directors, who are afforded
primacy,123 insofar as they are the ultimate decisionmakers “over both the direction of the
enterprise and the distribution among team members of production rents and surpluses.”124 Put
simply, TPT recognizes the interdependency between the parties that make up a debtor’s
stakeholders, (both creditor and noncreditor), and their expectations of what they would receive in
a bankruptcy scenario based on their respective contractual relations with the debtor.
For LoPucki, the way to solve the collective action problem is to place trust in the debtor’s
board to lead the team and oversee the maximization of value in insolvency.125 LoPucki observes
that directors “generally dominate the relationship”126 between a firm’s stakeholders. This is how
the debtor and its stakeholders contract outside of bankruptcy, and so TPT merely extends this
relationship, with its accompanying directorial leadership, to a restructuring under insolvency
law.127 The idea is that team members have this in mind at the moment they first join the team.128
Team members are, on some level, aware that “[p]reservation of the firm's going concern value
usually requires that much of the team remain in place and continue to produce during a
reorganization… [though] adjustments to the team production arrangement may be necessary.”129
The initial contractual relations under TPT incorporate insolvency law and pre-emptively consent
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to a reorganization.130 In other words, “[b]y leaving the board in full control, while at the same
time limiting creditors and shareholders to their bankruptcy entitlements, the Team Production
contract has, in effect, granted the non-legally enforceable entitlements of team member priority
over the legally enforceable claims of creditors and interests of shareholders.”131 Much like Warren
then, LoPucki favours restructuring to liquidation, insofar as the goal is, whenever possible, to
keep the “team” together and its arrangement in place. The justification, says LoPucki, is that a
going concern business will have assets with sufficient value to satisfy the team’s entitlements and
“assure creditors and shareholders of eventual payment of the liquidation values to which they are
entitled.”132 TPT does not entirely dismiss liquidation, recognizing that a debtor should only
remain operational if benefits from the continuation of the business exceed the value of its
liquidation.133 However, LoPucki asserts that TPT is capable of justifying reorganization over
liquidation that could yield greater value.134 He explains that “the sale should occur only when the
directors choose to sell, the unambiguous contract of a team member entitles that member to a sale,
or the sale is for the benefit of a non-team member.”135 A sale to a third party who pays a premium
but then “default[s] on team entitlements reduces rather than increases social wealth.”136 The
implication here is that the short term gain from the premium is outweighed by longer term gains
from continuing to operate the business and thus benefitting its production team. Essentially, TPT
considers insolvency law a useful tool for ensuring that a firm can meet the nonbankruptcy
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entitlements of its team members.137 That is, team members play dual roles, where: “the firm
becomes an adversary to creditors and shareholders with respect to their formal claims, but
continues to represent them as a fiduciary with respect to their team production entitlements.”138
(vii) Economic Theory of the Firm
Whereas LoPucki directly challenges CBT, drawing more from Warren than from Jackson,
Jassmine Girgis’139 approach is closer to Jackson and Baird’s focus on economic rights. Girgis
draws a connection between the economic theory of the firm and insolvency law. 140 In essence, a
corporation is taken to be made up of a composite of contractual relations, which “formation will
occur so long as it is efficient to form it, meaning so long as it costs less to coordinate these
activities within a firm than it does in the market.”141 The value of a firm as a going concern thus
extends beyond its asset value, and into the development and preservation of this bundle of
relations.142 Corporate restructuring law is thought to support this notion of value, because it is
typically aimed at the reorganization of a debtor with a view to maintaining going concern value,
continuing the business with very few changes to the value-generating web of contracts.143 Girgis
questions whether this is still the case. Much of insolvency law was formulated at a period in time
where the structure of a corporation was quite different from what it is today.144 The proposition
is: “if firm assets are less specific to their particular firms, and are more capable of being utilized
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in other firms, then they need not stay within the debtor firm to retain their value.”145 In simple
terms:
[k]eeping an insolvent company going is one of the main purposes of restructuring
legislation, in order to maintain the company’s going concern value. It is therefore an
implicit acknowledgement that intangible value exists in the company when courts work
with the creditors and creditors’ claims are compromised in an effort to achieve a plan.
Therefore, the entire reason behind restructuring is to save that going concern value,
namely the elements of a firm that contribute to that intangible economic value.146

But if the nature of the corporation has changed such that assets need not remain with a
firm to generate value, this in turn would invite some level of liquidation and raises questions about
whether going concern value is firm-specific.147 This harkens back to CBT, as then the focus of
insolvency law—if one assumes that the nature of the corporation has indeed changed to this
degree—is to recognize and uphold economic rights. Girgis is careful to note that restructuring
proceedings may still be the appropriate choice for firms with certain kinds of assets and structures.
For instance, looking at contractual relation networks, Girgis states that “part of the value in that
network comes from the relationship between the individuals and the assets, so even assuming the
transfer is possible, some value would nonetheless be lost if the assets were not transferred along
with the network.”148 This is a point which, she recognizes, generates some debate in the literature,
resulting in uncertainties over the viability of duplicating a firm’s network.
Girgis’ arguments raise concerns about changes in firms’ assets and capital structures not
being reflected by legislation. Referring to the trend of liquidations under the CCAA, for example,
Girgis states: “the way courts have been responding to applications for liquidation under the CCAA
may be a response to the changing nature of corporations and how they perceive restructuring
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legislation can and should be dealing with it.”149 The point here is that by allowing the use of the
CCAA—originally meant to maintain debtors’ value as going concerns—to carry out the very
thing it was enacted to avoid may signal that restructuring legislation has been outpaced by the
evolution of the structure of the modern corporation. Accordingly, this view does not so much
focus on issues of vulnerability or noncreditor concerns, but considers whether insolvency law
currently reflects the true nature of firms and provides the necessary tools to maximize the value
of an insolvent firm’s assets.
(viii) Contract Bankruptcy
In keeping with the tradition of law and economics theorists, especially CBT, Alan
Schwartz’s approach also prefers to focus on the parties’ initial, pre-insolvency, contractual
decisions.150 This approach envisions an insolvency system whose rules serve only two purposes:
“[they are] necessary to protect the integrity of the system itself,” or foster effective solutions ex
post “when the parties cannot reach the efficient outcome on their own.”151 For Schwartz,
insolvency law is aimed primarily towards maximizing firm value and lowering “the costs of
realizing that value.”152 The state of insolvency law is such that parties are forced to renegotiate
their contractual relations ex post to reach resolution.153 Debtors are not permitted to contract for
specific bankruptcy procedures, and so are not always able to contract with creditors in a way best
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geared towards maximizing insolvency payments, such that “firms must [sometimes] pay too much
for debt capital when projects are funded.”154
Schwartz considers insolvency law to be an integral part of business law.155 However,
“[o]ne size cannot fit all,”156 and so the parties should be able to decide which system of insolvency
law to use.157 One of the central tensions in insolvency is that: “the firm’s managers or owners will
prefer the bankruptcy system that is more likely to permit the firm to survive or to enable them to
enjoy control privileges for a longer time if it ultimately fails[,]… [whereas] creditors will prefer
the system that maximizes the firm's net expected insolvency return because creditors can recover
only monetary returns.”158 Moreover, these privileges are difficult or impossible to quantify in
court, which is reflected in lending agreements’ inability to efficiently limit this spending, resulting
in a “source of conflict between the firm and its creditors.”159 This divergence in motivations,
Schwartz contends, might be best resolved at the initial contracting stage, i.e., when lending is
initially negotiated.160 A debtor chooses an ideal insolvency system “when it picks the system that
maximizes the sum of monetary returns and private benefits.”161
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The problem then is that “[f]irms thus face the difficult problem of choosing between a
suboptimal capital structure that would avoid bankruptcy or reduce bankruptcy costs and an
otherwise optimal capital structure that will compel the firm, if insolvent, to use a suboptimal
bankruptcy system.”162 As a solution, Schwartz proposes that a debtor can contract with multiple
different creditors at different times to reach the most efficient outcomes vis-à-vis insolvency.163
Efficiency here means selecting the insolvency system that allows for the best possible satisfaction
of creditors of the protection and resolution of their eventual claims, in order that the debtor may
receive the highest possible amount of funds therefrom.164 Allowing this form of insolvency
contracting lowers the cost of credit and affords the debtor with the best funding so that it may be
less restrained in its choice of projects to undertake.165 Since this form of contracting is not legal,
what actually happens in practice is the renegotiation of the initial lending contract, which
produces financing constraints for debtor firms.166
Schwartz’s approach accordingly coincides with CBT, especially with Baird,167 in that he
sees “[t]he major goal of business law is to maximize social wealth… [and the] bankruptcy system
best realizes… [this goal] by maximizing the value of bankrupt estates.”168 Additionally, Schwartz
would limit objectives outside of wealth maximization, preferring instead to focus efforts on
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maximizing a debtor’s insolvency value, and thus lowering the cost of debt financing.169 Concerns
like the “interests of the community” are thus not essential aims of insolvency law, because there
are usually competitive substitutes for a debtor firm, which the community can weigh with the
costs of retaining the debtor firm when it is seriously insolvent.170 Similarly, Schwartz’s approach
might unfairly favor stronger parties at the negotiating table, particularly given the inherent
obstacles for weaker, less experienced, and less commercially sophisticated parties. Like CBT,
Schwartz prefers a contractarian approach, which limits insolvency legislation to addressing the
collective action problem, and protects and upholds parties’ nonbankruptcy entitlements. The ideal
system for Schwartz is one that provides “parties with a default system, but also with a set of
additional systems among which parties can choose,”171 thus favouring minimal intervention by
the state in the realm of insolvency law.
Like Schwartz, Baird’s more recent take on insolvency law alongside Robert Rasmussen
also strongly favours a free market approach.172 These authors argue that “the ability of investors
to contract among themselves and the presence of liquid markets for going concerns undercut the
need for a law of corporate reorganizations.”173 Baird and Rasmussen distinguish between control
and cash-flow rights; the former are “rights to deploy a firm’s assets,”174 and the latter “parcel
financial claims[,]… specify[ing] how the returns from an enterprise should be distributed.”175
Crucially, and the source of many of Girgis’s above arguments, the modern firm is structured with
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a proactive strategy in place to deal with potential financial dire straits.176 Investors contract among
themselves over control rights, which Baird and Rasmussen say does away with many concerns
purportedly addressed by insolvency law.177 Insolvency law recognizes that when insolvency
happens, control rights may shift from a firm’s internal actors (i.e., the board), to creditors, which
can lead to negative results.178 Yet while this is a principal concern and raison d’être for insolvency
law,179 Baird and Rasmussen maintain that modern creditors can anticipate such difficulties, and
know to restrain destructive use of control rights without it.180
These authors consider that such rights are not inherently intransigent, in that they are
dispensed by corporate/securities law, and lending agreements, all of which can serve to allocate
control in diligent, albeit different, ways.181 Further, so long as these rights retain effective
management when the firm is doing well, and replace management when it is not, there is no need
for insolvency law to step in.182 In the modern era, especially in the American and Canadian
context, the debtor-in-possession (DIP) model of insolvency law provides senior creditors with a
certain authoritative primacy.183 That is, DIP financing means that a debtor’s major lender(s) will
exercise power over management tantamount to an overriding, supervisory authority.184 Baird and
Rasmussen are unphased by this however, stating: “the senior lender who will not be paid in full
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will more likely exercise control in a sensible fashion than will managers whose net worth depends
on continuation or a bankruptcy judge whose training is usually not in business operations.”185
Given the tendency of such lenders to prefer selling off assets, it is unsurprising that these authors
conclude that big corporations are making use of restructuring legislation principally for
liquidation.186
Quite aside from the tendency of senior (usually secured) creditors to dominate in this way,
two major changes that call into question the value of restructuring law are the capital structure of
the modern firm, and the market therefor.187 Baird and Rasmussen point out that “[t]he specialized
assets of a firm today are often intangible… [and in] a winner-take-all economy, such assets are
likely to have value only for the firms that flourish and not the ones that encounter financial
distress.”188 This means that even in a firm where value is derived from a team of individuals
(intangible assets), it is rarely the case that value is inherently tied to their remaining in a specific
firm.189 Baird and Rasmussen suggest that value is instead found in the contracts that keep these
individuals together, which, while incurring costs of their own, may be assigned to or drawn up
for different firms, with infinite variability.190 Even hard assets, like mines or breweries, are of
little value if they are not accompanied by a promising business plan.191 It is for these reasons that
Baird and Rasmussen find it hard to justify insolvency law, stating: “[o]ne can point to neither the
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size of a firm alone nor the existence of firm-specific assets to conclude that corporation
reorganization law has an important role to play in our modem economy.”192
(ix) Bankruptcy & Community Interests
Karen Gross’s approach is critical of law and economics-oriented theorists, and more onbrand with Warren.193 Gross finds such theories too restricted, given their narrow focus on
quantifiable value.194 She especially takes issue with their neglect of the interests of the
community.195 Further, Gross contends that law and economics theories of insolvency law take a
negative view of human nature, categorizing it as inherently selfish as opposed to prone to a “desire
for altruism.”196 Much like Warren, she advocates for an expanded view of insolvency law that
would encompass more than just relations between debtor and creditors.197 Gross approaches
insolvency law from the perspective of communitarianism and feminism: “feminism addresses
how to think about people and the world in which we live[,]… [which the] experiences of women
have served to reveal,”198 and “[communitarianism] views individuals as connected to each other
and obligated to act in the interests of the good of the community, even if that curtails some
individual freedom.”199 Together, these approaches contrast with law and economics insolvency
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theorists’ focus on individual rights,200 with Gross’s approach favouring an expanded, and more
flexible economic modeling of value in insolvency.201
Taking community interests into account does not mean such interests necessarily coincide
with a debtor firm’s.202 That is, it does not connote that failing companies must be saved.203 Nor
does it mean that community interests take priority over all other concerns.204 Community interests
are not always paramount but the inherent difficulty or impossibility of plugging them numerically
into an equation should not automatically disqualify them.205 Rather, Gross maintains that
reshaping our understanding of value, and expanding the scope of considerations beyond what is
quantifiable is the ultimate goal in optimizing our understandings in insolvency law.
(x) Conclusions About Insolvency Theory
The foregoing theories provide a variety of viewpoints on whether and to what extent the
state should be the principal arbiter when a firm finds itself in insolvency. One thing most of these
theories can agree on is that insolvency law resolves the collective action problem.206 From there,
deviations primarily centre on the scope of insolvency law (i.e., narrower focus on creditor
recovery and wealth maximization, or broader consideration of socioeconomic concerns), and its
adaptation to changes in business. Notably, those who advocate for a reduced role—or no role at
all—for insolvency law state that changes in business/capital structures have far outpaced
legislation meant to deal with much simpler structures. Such advocates favour a hands-off
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approach, in light of the fact that a market for the sale of financially distressed firms exists. Critics
argue the opposite, maintaining that these approaches lead to diminishing consideration of and
protections for vulnerable stakeholders of a debtor firm. Accordingly, they seek to extend the scope
of insolvency law. The theories also illustrate the sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit
motivations of the parties, (i.e., debtor, and secured and unsecured creditors), and how these are
reflected in the different proposed approaches to insolvency law. A clear understanding of the
theories that attempt to make sense of insolvency law is crucial for any analysis that seeks to
ascribe changes to the law. By situating these theories, and then observing how they manifest in
insolvency policy, we can better understand the CCAA itself. Before turning specifically to the
CCCA, the following section examines major Canadian and international policy guides and
documents, to observe how insolvency theory figures into the building blocks of insolvency law.
PART II – THEORY REFLECTED IN POLICY: GUIDING INSOLVENCY LAW
(i) United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) & World Bank
UNCITRAL provides what is probably the most comprehensive policy and legislative
guide for insolvency law: the Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law (the Guide).207 This widely
cited document is a result of consultations with stakeholders in the international insolvency
community, geared towards creating a cohesive set of principles and suggestions on how to best
structure national insolvency regimes.208 The UNCITRAL guide provides a list of what it considers
to be widely accepted objectives. These reflect many of the theories we have observed here. The
list includes: promoting certainty in the market, maximizing asset value, balancing between
reorganization and liquidation of a debtors’ business, treating like creditors equally, fostering
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“timely, efficient and impartial resolution[s],” preserving debtor assets for “equitable distribution
to creditors,” incentivizing transparency through information sharing, protecting existing creditor
rights and priorities, and integrating a cross-border insolvency framework.209
Many of these objectives echo what has been found in the various theoretical approaches
to be the most important feature(s) of insolvency law. For instance, in recognizing the need to
maximize asset value, the Guide notes that this “is often furthered by achieving a balance of the
risks allocated between the parties.”210 Likewise, equal treatment for creditors is not about being
“treated identically, but in a manner that reflects the different bargains they have struck with the
debtor.”211 The Guide thus consistently suggests a balance between opposing positions, such as
distributing payment and distributing risk, the favourability of a reorganization versus
liquidation,212 and careful consideration of the preferences of stronger and weaker parties.213
Importantly, the Guide’s view “is predicated on the basic economic theory that greater value may
be obtained from keeping the essential components of a business together, rather than breaking
them up and disposing of them in fragments.”214 The accuracy of this view is increasingly
challenged, as we saw when considering Baird and Rasmussen, Girgis, and Schwartz, among
others. Still, the Guide does not necessarily uphold reorganization as the only or even leading
option available in the case of a corporate insolvency.
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It stipulates that the key is predictability,215 and that an approach that has strong positive
tendencies towards reorganization “should not result in establishing a safe haven for moribund
enterprises.”216 The Guide essentially recommends that an insolvency scheme include a sampling
of strategies suggested in the different theoretical approaches for dealing with insolvency concerns.
It proposes that insolvency law balance different objectives by “reapportioning the risks of
insolvency in a way that suits a State’s economic, social and political goals,”217 while cautioning
against overloading insolvency law with issues that may be best resolved outside of it.218 Perhaps
most importantly, the Guide recognizes that “society is constantly evolving, [so] insolvency law
cannot be static, but requires reappraisal at regular intervals to ensure that it meets current social
needs.”219
The World Bank has also developed a set of principles on effective insolvency systems,
which it describes as “a distillation of international best practice on design aspects of these
[insolvency law] systems, emphasizing contextual, integrated solutions and the policy choices
involved in developing those solutions.”220 Though the World Bank’s analysis contains some
differences, its goal is to provide consistency with the UNCITRAL Guide.221 As such, its
enumerated principles do not significantly depart from the Guide’s, touching on each of the
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objectives mentioned there, adding only that an insolvency system should operate harmoniously
with a nation’s existing legal and commercial business practices.222 Likewise, the World Bank
recognizes the need to balance competing theories and approaches to insolvency law, primarily
through information sharing and stakeholder representation mechanisms.223
(ii) Industry Canada
In its review of Canadian insolvency legislation, Industry Canada—since renamed
Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISEDC)224—also largely reflects
UNCITRAL’s balancing approach. In fact, its list of objectives for insolvency policy references
an analysis of the Guide itself.225 ISEDC states that “[t]he objectives underlying the BIA and
CCAA include minimizing the impact of a debtor’s insolvency on all stakeholders by pursuing an
equitable distribution of the debtor’s assets and, where possible, by rehabilitation of the debtor.”226
These are best achieved by legislation that embodies the same principles/objectives espoused by
the UNCITRAL Guide and the World Bank.227 Moreover, ISEDC stresses the important function
of insolvency law in the economy, as it provides a measure of certainty in lending practices, which
“influences credit market risks… [and] can affect the cost and availability of credit.”228
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(iii) Standing Senate Committee on Banking, Trade & Commerce
In 2003, the above Senate Committee carried out a review of insolvency legislation in
Canada. In its report, it maintained that the essential ingredients for a successful insolvency system
are: “fairness, accessibility, predictability, responsibility, cooperation, efficiency and
effectiveness.”229 Of these, it maintained that fairness reigns supreme.230 Like the UNCITRAL
Guide and the World Bank, the Committee was careful to balance between the opposing positions
of a free market-oriented approach and a rehabilitation-focused approach:231
The redistributive effects of bankruptcy must be considered from the perspective of
fairness, since bankruptcy-related losses for creditors may lead to higher costs of credit for
those who pay their debts fully and in a timely manner. In some sense, fairness would
dictate that the burden faced by those who pay their debts must not be too great because of
the actions and omissions of those who do not.232

Notwithstanding these statements, the Committee uses language that seems to favour the
approaches of Warren and Gross. It states that insolvency law “must consider the social and
economic costs of bankruptcy and ensure that these costs are minimized and shared
appropriately… [and] must also facilitate the efficient reallocation of resources in the event of
bankruptcy.”233 Ultimately, the Committee also reflects on the need to balance between reasonable
rehabilitative measures for debtors with spreading the losses amongst creditors equitably.234
(iv) Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform
Around the time of the above Committee’s report, the Insolvency Institute of Canada and
the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals came together to deliver
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the Joint Task Force on Business Insolvency Law Reform Report (the JTF Report).235 Among its
consideration of Canadian insolvency legislation, reforms, and concerns, the JTF defined the
principles which guided their recommendations. These were largely the same objectives that we
have seen in the above documents: “going concern solutions that can minimize the economic and
social costs resulting from insolvency”236 are generally preferred to liquidations (unless there is
more value in the latter),237 this is a business decision best left to the parties and not to the courts,238
and insolvency law needs a proper balance of flexibility and certainty to foster creative solutions
and workable transactions.239
(v) Conclusions Regarding Insolvency Policy
The preceding policy documents illustrate attempts to balance between opposing
approaches in insolvency law theory. The result is typically recommendations which address key
concerns and proposed solutions examined in the theory. Policy recommendations and proposed
principles/objectives usually take a middle ground approach, although the scope is always broader
than a singular focus on creditor recovery and wealth maximization. In the following pages, a
specific insolvency statute, the CCAA, is examined to observe how theory and policy take root in
the practice of restructuring law in Canada. The review of theory and policy thus far situates many
of the issues in the CCAA caselaw and literature. As is discussed below, the balancing approach
observed in insolvency policy finds purchase in judges’ understandings of the objectives of the
CCAA.
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PART III – THE CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY & INSOLVENCY LAW REGIME
Canada has two principal insolvency law regimes,240 the CCAA and the Bankruptcy and
Insolvency Act (BIA).241 The CCAA has been defined as “an enactment intended to permit a
compromise or arrangement between an insolvent company and its unsecured and secured
creditors, or any class of them.”242 This is more than the Act itself says about its purposes,243
though the key principles of the CCAA may be summarized as follows:
1. Some insolvent companies are more valuable as going concerns than they are on
liquidation.
2. Contracts with creditors, trading partners and other stakeholders must be adjusted to
preserve the insolvent company as a going concern.
3. Due to the threat that creditors may exercise their enforcement rights and the complexity
and interdependency of adjustments with a large number of constituencies, a formal system
of reorganization under court supervision is required.
4. The decision to reorganize should be made with the consent of the debtor.244

Even more perplexing, the CCAA does not define key terms like ‘restructuring’, ‘plan of
arrangement’, or ‘compromise’.245 This makes it an Act that has historically depended on the
interpretation of the courts.246 Like its counterparts throughout the world, the CCAA serves as a
continuous experiment in the application of insolvency law theory, both in its development through
caselaw, and through the writings of scholars who have sought define its theoretical underpinnings.
The Supreme Court of Canada in Callidus aptly summarized this: “[u]ltimately, the relative weight
that the different objectives of the CCAA take on in a particular case may vary based on the factual
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circumstances, the stage of the proceedings, or the proposed solutions that are presented to the
court for approval.”247 As discussed directly above, analysis of the CCAA yields a variety of
theoretical approaches, which may be described “as a fusion of two competing theories on the
policy of bankruptcy and insolvency law,” CBT and LDT.248 Some authors have also suggested
that there is no clear theoretical basis for the CCAA.249
The overarching principle in Canadian insolvency law is fairness,250 which informs the
approval of the plan of arrangement under the CCAA, and is also inseparable from a court’s
analysis, regardless of what issues are before it. One extreme manifestation of fairness is
consideration of the public interest, which may be explained as meaning that insolvency law
“reaches beyond purely commercial interests to [encompass] multiple interests affected by firm
failure.”251 In the first part of this Chapter, we observed theories around the purpose and function
of insolvency law. The opposing elements of CBT and LDT are reflected in the objectives of the
CCAA. This is because there is a spectrum of theory, from which the Canadian insolvency law
regimes draw their defining principles. Janis Sarra outlines three basic approaches: Market Theory,
Debt Collection Theory, and Rehabilitation Theory.252 Briefly, Market Theory, as its name
denotes, gives primacy to the operation of the market, whereby insolvency law serves only “to
clarify priority of creditors’ claims, to assist with liquidation or the smooth transition of control to
creditors.”253 Accordingly, this theory prefers skeletal/flexible legislation, and leaves it to the
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freehand of the market to determine how best to “maximize creditor return,” whether through
restructuring or liquidating.254 On a similar note, Debt Collection Theory is also focused on
economic rights but “differs from pure market theory because it endorses state intervention to
assist with collective action problems.”255 The sole purpose of insolvency law for Debt Collection
Theory is to maximize the pool of assets, promoting the most efficient distribution thereof to
creditors.256 Finally, Rehabilitation Theory is principally about preservation of the debtor as a
going concern, (i.e., continuing to operate).257 This theory takes the stance that “insolvent
corporations may be so important to national or local economies that these interests take
precedence over original capital investments… [such that] the state is justified in compromising
existing creditor claims in order for the debtor corporation to attract new capital.”258
As may be evident given the discussions in Parts I and II, none of these theoretical
approaches alone defines insolvency law or policy, nor do they provide the sole influence for the
CCAA. For instance, Market Theory is not practical, given that there is significant state
intervention into the market outside of insolvency law, including “securities regulation and
corporations and competition statutes.”259 We have already explored the shortcomings of Debt
Collection Theory, which is principally that it is too narrow. Like Market Theory, both are “limited
in their analysis because their definition of interest recognizes only equity and debt capital
investment in the firm… [ignoring] other investments that contribute value and which may be
vitally important to decision making in terms of wealth maximization.”260 Lastly, Rehabilitation
Theory lacks economic sense, in that certain debtors will necessarily be better off liquidating, and
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a policy of keeping a firm going no matter what may only result in a gain for shareholders and,
ultimately, an inevitable liquidation.261 The spectrum of theory thus ranges from barebones
legislation and little government interference, (Market Theory)—Debt Collection Theory is closest
to Market Theory, but not as extreme—to comprehensive legislation and a strong role for the state
(Rehabilitation Theory). Where does this leave us?
The CCAA draws from each of these theories in turn. Market Theory underscores the
importance of the business of the debtor, in that a successful plan must be a “viable business
plan.”262 However, such a plan must also take heed of the socioeconomic environment in which a
firm operates, taking care to account for factors beyond simple repayment of creditors.263 Warren’s
LDT is closer to the extreme of Rehabilitation Theory, which theory inspires our consideration of
the public interest, along with other vulnerability and fairness analyses. Rehabilitation Theory also
delineates our default rule of preferring reorganization to liquidation. One last point is worth
noting, and that is that the CCAA also has the principal objective of “mitigating collective action
problems.”264 As will be explored further in Chapter Two, one of its means of achieving this
objective is by employing the monitor as a neutral information intermediary. This flows directly
from Debt Collection Theory, and perhaps more specifically from Jackson and Baird’s
understanding of how collective proceedings that operate in harmony with nonbankruptcy
entitlements provide the best possible venue for mediating bankruptcy and insolvency. The CCAA
thus embraces multiple policy objectives,265 drawing from the whole spectrum of theories. But is
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this a satisfactory explanation for the change from its 1933 use to avoid liquidation,266 to the
current practice of liquidating CCAAs? Is it enough to say that the CCAA’s objectives and policy
goals are undulating? What does this mean as regards the purpose and function of insolvency law?
Courts and scholars have long grappled with the tension between using the CCAA for a
restructuring (rescue) or a liquidation (sale). Exploration of the arguments for and against each
approach help to reveal much about the CCAA’s theoretical core.
Reorganization may be understood simply as “arrangements between debtors and creditors
under which the creditors agree to accept something less than full and timely payment of their
debts.”267 The resulting reduction of creditor claims comes about through a careful balance
between preservation and modification of existing legal rights.268 Though the CCAA has
historically been understood to prefer reorganization where possible,269 “[i]t should be kept in
mind, however, that the purpose… is not to force a reorganization of the company so that it
survives at all costs… [but] to facilitate a reorganization that is fair under the circumstances.”270
After all, liquidations can often incur lower costs than the deliberative process of negotiating a
restructuring,271 and courts have increasingly approved such transactions where they yield better
results.272 The main tension seems to be not only that the CCAA was not designed for such sales,
but also that “[w]hen liquidation is avoided and the firm continues in business, junior classes of
claimants are able to use uncertainty over the value of the firm to argue for more favourable
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treatment.”273 The flipside is that stronger, often secured, creditors typically prefer a liquidation,
and so may exert pressure to pursue one, regardless of whether it would produce the best value for
the creditors as a whole.274 This perhaps stark practice is not new. In fact, “[t]he Act as it was
originally envisaged facilitated the resolution of differences between the corporate debtor and the
secured financier… [wherein] unsecured creditors had no leverage over the debtor.”275
The “CCAA process is geared towards the development of a plan of arrangement that will
be presented before the creditors for their acceptance or rejection.”276 Understood in this way,
liquidating CCAAs alter the process, making use of the flexibility of the statute to facilitate
“diminution of the private law rights of a third party or the granting of a judicially authorized
preference usually in favour of commercially sophisticated and powerful creditors.” 277 This
tension between restructuring and liquidation is also present, albeit somewhat differently, in the
United States counterpart to the CCAA: Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.278 American
commentators suggest that to conceive of creditor recovery maximization as the topmost objective
of insolvency legislation “is putting the cart before the horse.”279 Like Canadian scholars who
maintain that the CCAA is primarily intended to facilitate restructurings, (where possible), these
American commentators stress that “[r]ehabilitation remains a predominant, if not the
predominant, objective.”280 Interestingly, they also recognize the influence of creditors,
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particularly powerful senior/secured creditors, and suggest that insolvency legislation needs to be
strengthened to realign it with the goal of rehabilitation, and lessen the effects of creditor control.281
Two elements of the theoretical debate and CCAA policy maelstrom are especially
noteworthy. These are that history has revealed a slow but sure change in the use of insolvency
legislation, and that strong/secured creditors are one of the most influential parties. Indeed, these
themes are so pervasive, that conceivably observing them together should reveal a deeper
understanding of the CCAA, and Canadian insolvency law generally.
The answer to lingering questions is perhaps as simple as considering the history of the
legislation. In Century Services, the Court states: “[i]n order to properly interpret the provisions,
it is necessary to examine the history of the CCAA, its function amidst the body of insolvency
legislation enacted by Parliament, and the principles that have been recognized in the
jurisprudence.”282 In her recent book,283 Virginia Torrie traces the history of the CCAA, and offers
an analysis that might resolve these leftover questions. Torrie notes that, from its inception as a
remedy for bondholders,284 to its current use, the CCAA has essentially remained a ‘secured
creditor statute’.285 To summarize Torrie’s text is beyond the scope of this project, however a few
key points will suffice to outline her argument. As stated, the Act’s inception as a bondholder
remedy favoured the interests of secured creditors, being the bondholders themselves. At this time,
based on the nature of credit, such bondholders not only had a security interest, but also stood to
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profit

from

the

continuing

success

of

the

debtor

company,

much

like

today’s

equity(share)holders.286 Skipping ahead a few years, while there were complaints that the CCAA
was not being used fairly, interest groups representing bondholders and unsecured creditors—after
many years negotiating—came together to agree to a restructuring statute that would still protect
the weaker (unsecured) creditors.287
Over the next few decade, from the 1950s until the 1980s, CCAA underwent a period of
scant use as the Canadian economy soared before facing its next recession(s). 288 At this time,
finance had undergone its own changes, the most significant of which, in terms of the CCAA, was
that companies were borrowing from banks instead of raising money in the capital markets.289
These lenders “relied on the priority and strength of their security vis-à-vis other secured and
unsecured creditors, and displayed little interest in coordinating with smaller creditors in cases of
debtor default.”290 Such lending practices, especially the lack of precautions banks exercised, led
to some being dangerously exposed to defaulting debtors.291 As provincial and federal
governments stepped in to avoid economic catastrophe, their solution was to offer funding for the
restructurings of afflicted lenders.292 As Torrie puts it: “[d]uring the 1980s recession, courts, banks,
and the provincial and federal governments effectively (re)affirmed corporate reorganization
through insolvency law and receivership as a commercially and politically desirable response to

Ibid at 26 (“[t]he key elements of bondholder floating charges under Canadian trust deeds were the long-term nature
of the credit arrangement and the charge on the business undertaking as part of the security for the loan[,]… [thus
giving] bondholders an interest in the long-term success of the company[,]… [such that] the presumptive response to
debtor failure by bondholders… was to restructure the enterprise” ibid).
287
Ibid at 74–75 (“[t]he minutes of the meeting indicate that the two organizations had conferred beforehand and had
agreed on a compromise that would address both positions: limiting the CCAA to companies with outstanding bond
issues under a trust deed and running in favour of a trustee[,]… [which] would ensure that companies could not use
the act to take advantage of their junior and unsecured creditors” ibid).
288
Ibid at 89.
289
Ibid.
290
Ibid at 90.
291
Ibid at 92.
292
Ibid.
286

47

the insolvency of large firms.”293 This government solution was met with no opposition, as it had
one of the strongest votes of confidence on its side, that of secured creditors.294
The reason, Torrie argues, why secured creditors have been so well positioned to have their
interested reflected in the CCAA is by virtue of its skeletal nature and strong reliance on the
judiciary.295 Insolvency law in Canada does not undergo consistent, rapid, or even wide-reaching
reform, and so “there is significant scope for new ideas to infiltrate and influence CCAA law
developments via case law rather than through the relatively rare instances of formal insolvency
law reform in Canada.”296 By pursuing change in the courts, secured creditors keep the impetus of
legal rule changes on their side, because while they may lose out on the occasional case, they will
typically be able to “advocate a specific outcome in one case, but leave their options open about
how potential future cases might be resolved.”297
Torrie’s analysis is persuasive in that it demonstrates how an understanding of historical
context elucidates the workings of insolvency law, in this case of a specific statute: the CCAA.298
The cyclical nature of the economy, and the changing nature of some of its components—like
credit—precipitate changes in this unique area of the law designed to respond to negative economic
consequences. The “actors” understandings of the CCAA in a given time have been significantly
shaped by the broader context of their respective place in history.”299 Similarly, our understanding
of the CCAA, a statute of multiple objectives, spanning the gamut of the theoretical spectrum, is
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perhaps also influenced by our place in history. Viewed this way, it makes more sense why courts
place more or less weight on value maximization, debtor rehabilitation, and the correlating choice
of whether to restructure or liquidate. The answer, one lawyers are often criticized for resorting to,
is that it depends, although following Torrie it would be more correct to say: it depends on the
historical context.
At the outset of this Chapter, we considered that the common law has widely accepted that
insolvency law functions to mitigate the collective action problem, reorganize healthy businesses
so they might continue, and rehabilitate debtors so they may begin anew.300 In the context of the
CCAA, a more accurate understanding might be that the first is a given, and the second and third
are negotiable, depending on the circumstances of the day.
PART IV - CONCLUSION
This historical analysis provides a lens through which we can examine the statute, its
influence, and the sources of its continued use in much higher definition. For instance, the change
in the judiciary in the 1980s and 1990s into a “far more policy-conscious and even activist” bench
seems to coincide with the pronouncement of LDT and related theories that supported a larger than
economics approach to insolvency law.301 This too seems to reflect Torrie’s notion that historical
context informs actors’ understandings of the CCAA and their role therein. Likewise, Girgis’
observations about the changing, or already changed, nature of the structure of modern firms
perhaps suggest that we are at a point in history where legislation dealing with business may need
to adapt to this evolution. As we have travelled through time from nearly a century ago, where this
statute merely remedied bondholders, we can observe the confluence of interests and protections
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that today make up a very flexible and highly used statute. LDT, and the extreme of Rehabilitation
Theory, has surely influenced an increased regard for unsecured creditors, and the oversight and
intermediary role played by the monitor, originally a creation of the courts.302 Likewise, the rising
trend in liquidating CCAAs surely draws on value maximization, a central tenet of CBT. What the
CCAA does that has differentiated it from other insolvency law statutes, is that it allows judges
the discretion to act on instances of unfairness or foul play, when the actors in a proceeding
impinge on one of the CCAA’s multiple policy objectives. In some cases, value maximization will
be the goal, whereas in others, preservation may very well be the desired outcome.303 Yet no
matter the scenario, the CCAA by necessity operates to subdue the collective action problem, and
asks judges to only approve a plan that most fairly resolves disputing claims while preserving the
best possible value. As Janis Sarra has stated:
Any restructuring plan devised must create efficiencies and enhance the value of the
corporation such that it will be able to successfully compete in the market place. Insolvency
law must be situated in the social and economic context in which corporations operate,
recognizing that multiple factors affect restructuring decisions, beyond narrow assessment
of commercial requirements on an individual case-by-case basis.304

Extending this multi-theory, or multi-policy, understanding, along with Torrie’s historical
approach, we can better discern the nature of the practice of CCAA today. The CCAA is not simply
the product of applying the theories we have observed to real-world cases. Such legislation is often
the product of a confluence of contributing factors, such as abstract ideas, ardently defended
interests, and the adequacy of the institutions responsible for its application. 305 Courts have
observed that it is the flexibility of the CCAA scheme which “permits a broad balancing of these
[multiple] objectives and the multiple stakeholder interests engaged when a corporation faces
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insolvency.”306 As mentioned at the outset, this flexibility is embodied in the broad discretion
afforded to CCAA judges, whose repeated practices have, over time, been codified to form part of
the legislative scheme.307 The monitor itself is a creature of CCAA judicial discretion,308 which,
as will be observed in the following Chapter, is often located at the centre of the court’s balancing
of the CCAA’s multiple policy objectives. Accordingly, Chapter One’s literature review of
insolvency theory, coupled with its examination of those theories in insolvency policy, clarify the
underpinnings of Canadian insolvency law. Study of the CCAA itself revealed it to be a product
of these underpinnings, in combination with pressure exerted by secured creditors, themselves
likely using theory and policy in their arguments for why the law should function as it does today.
At this moment in the CCAA’s history, pressures are again mounting, only this time the concern
is around the independence of the monitor.
This project will suggest that the history of the CCAA, through its cases and its legislative
amendments, is leading toward further codification of the monitor’s role via its fiduciary duty.
Consequently, the rest of this study assumes the three broad functions of insolvency law in the
common law tradition to be true, but understands that they may wax, wane, and be supplemented
according to changes in the surrounding historical environment. In the following Chapter, the focus
shifts to the monitor, tracing the history of its role, slowly unpacking the law around it to reveal
its theoretical/policy inclinations, strengths, weaknesses, and considering how best to model this
role going forward. Chapter Two will reveal many of the problematic aspects of the role, centering
on its fiduciary duty as both a cause for concern and the potential solution.
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CHAPTER TWO
Introduction
The CCAA is Canada’s main statute for restructuring insolvent corporations.309 Its broad
purpose is to “facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors.”310
Central to the CCAA’s purpose is the role of the court-appointed monitor.311 Given the skeletal
nature of the CCAA, courts have historically employed an approach pairing liberal interpretation
with judicial discretion to “extend the limited words [in the legislation], and create needed tools
and remedies.”312 The monitor is a trustee and insolvency professional,313 appointed by the court
in its initial application order,314 to function as the court’s “eyes and ears.”315 It supplements the
court’s supervisory role with much-needed expertise.316 This Chapter examines the role of the
monitor, the scope of its powers, and its obligations to remain independent and avoid conflicts of
interest. The monitor is crucial to the proper functioning of the CCAA regime. At the same time,
commentators have raised valid concerns about the monitor’s role and its independence in light of
the scope of its powers. In Part I, I will review the history and evolution of the monitor’s role. Part
II examines the concerns with the monitor’s role raised by commentators and in the jurisprudence.
In Part III, I consider whether the CCAA regime has sufficient checks and balances to address the
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concerns explored in Part II. Finally, I will conclude that the monitor’s role, as currently conceived,
requires clarification so that it may perform its intended functions properly. Chapter Three will
then specifically address the monitor’s fiduciary duty, ultimately suggesting that it be codified in
response to concerns that it is unclear and that the role is generally exposed to conflict of interest.
PART I – ORIGINS OF THE MONITOR
The inception of the monitor can be traced back to a common practice of CCAA courts in
the 1980s and 1990s to appoint an accounting firm to perform a supervisory role in the
proceedings. This unique role was inspired, in part, by the role of the interim receiver, appointed
under section 46 of the BIA.317 The BIA interim receiver is charged with overseeing the property
of the debtor, often for the purpose of selling such, and in some instances exercising control over
aspects of its business.318 It too acts as a court-appointed officer, and owes a fiduciary duty to all
parties with an interest in the proceedings.319 In early CCAA caselaw, courts likened monitors to
interim receivers,320 and later stressed that the two roles served distinct purposes and functions.321
Prior to the 1997 amendments to the CCAA which codified the monitor’s role and made it
mandatory,322 it was common practice for “creditors seeking enhanced disclosure from debtor
corporations”323 to pursue this appointment. Given the strategic value of selecting the party to play
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this role, debtors soon circumvented creditors and asked the court to choose their own accounting
firms.324 Although these early appointments were tasked with “acting as a “watchdog” and
reporting to the court on the financial affairs of the company,”325 the fact that debtors’ accounting
firms—often their auditors326—were selected, raised questions about their independence and
impartiality.327 The courts took the view that the appointed role functioned as an extension of their
CCAA supervisory capacity,328 and “originally grounded the appointment of a court officer in their
inherent jurisdiction.”329 That is, courts saw a way to keep an eye on the parties via their appointed
watchdog. The first330 usage of the term “monitor” is traced to Northland Properties,331 where
Trainor J, as he then was, said: “I am satisfied that I have jurisdiction to appoint an interim receiver
and spell out the responsibilities of that office such that his true role would be that of a monitor or
watchdog during this interim period.”332
The rationale for this practice of appointing monitors, prior to the 1997 amendments, can
be summarized as follows. Its inception in the 1980s coincided with an economic crisis, such that
“[t]he appointment of monitors was perceived by the courts and the credit community as a
compromise between transferring management of the ailing enterprise into entirely new hands, on
one hand, and putting their faith in existing management not to run the business further into the
324
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ground, on the other.”333 In addition to its watchdog role, the monitor was seen as a means of
mitigating certain costs, especially those pertaining to court challenges for better disclosure of
debtor financial information.334 This is where the monitor as an information intermediary ensures
the free flow of information to the stakeholder collective, in a cost-effective manner. Finally, given
the complexities inherent in a CCAA case, the guidance and leadership of an expert in such matters
came to be an increasingly necessary and useful element.335
In its early years, and up until the time of its codification in 1997, the role of the monitor
could be defined as follows. First and foremost, the monitor is an officer or agent of the court, and
in that capacity “owes a fiduciary duty to all the parties and an obligation to ensure that one creditor
is not given an advantage over any other creditor.”336 As considered above, a central justification
for the role was that the monitor safeguarded creditors’ interests as a whole, by supervising and
reporting on the debtor’s activities to the court.337 The strong role of the courts in developing
CCAA law and practice produced a role that is adaptable, varying case-by-case.338 Although the
ultimate responsibility for supervising the CCAA process rests with the courts, judges make use
of the monitor as an adaptable tool through which to exercise the court’s authority and pursue the
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CCAA’s objectives.339 The 1997 amendments, which codified the role in section 11.7,340 upheld
this flexibility, “confirming that the court maintains the discretion to craft the role… to carry out
any other functions the court may direct.”341 The CCAA monitor is currently most concretely
defined by the following sections of the Act.342 First, its appointment in the initial order by the
supervising judge:
11.7 (1) When an order is made on the initial application in respect of a debtor company,
the court shall at the same time appoint a person to monitor the business and financial
affairs of the company. The person so appointed must be a trustee, within the meaning of
subsection 2(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act…
(2) Except with the permission of the court and on any conditions that the court may
impose, no trustee may be appointed as monitor in relation to a company
(a) if the trustee is or, at any time during the two preceding years, was
(i) a director, an officer or an employee of the company,
(ii) related to the company or to any director or officer of the company, or
(iii) the auditor, accountant or legal counsel, or a partner or an employee of the auditor,
accountant or legal counsel, of the company; or
(b) if the trustee is
(i) the trustee under a trust indenture issued by the company or any person related to the
company, or the holder of a power of attorney under an act constituting a hypothec within
the meaning of the Civil Code of Quebec that is granted by the company or any person
related to the company, or
(ii) related to the trustee, or the holder of a power of attorney, referred to in subparagraph
(i)…
(3) On application by a creditor of the company, the court may, if it considers it appropriate
in the circumstances, replace the monitor by appointing another trustee, within the meaning
of subsection 2(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, to monitor the business and
financial affairs of the company.343
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Next, the general duties and functions of the monitor, subject to modification by the
court,344 are found in section 23. These include publishing consistent and timely public notices
concerning claims,345 investigating and reviewing the debtor’s state of affairs,346 reporting
thereon,347 filing various reports based on the fruit of its investigations with the court,348 advising
the court on the soundness of any proposal or plan,349 and making all reports and opinions publicly
available,350 among other things. Finally, the monitor is bound to “act honestly and in good faith…
[when] exercising any of his or her powers or in performing any of his or her duties and
functions.”351 Together, these sections, along with the court’s inherent and statutory jurisdiction,352
and section 11 discretionary power,353 allow CCAA judges to appoint and configure the role of the
monitor in each case according to the particular facts of the day.354
At its most basic configuration, the monitor’s essential role bridging information gaps is
part of the CCAA’s response to the collective action problem in insolvency.355 The collective
action problem occurs when individual creditors act unilaterally to enforce their claims, frustrating
the efforts of creditors claiming thereafter, and ultimately reducing the value that a collective
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proceeding generates.356 Chapter One alluded to the monitor’s function as a guiding force which,
by virtue of its assumed neutrality, brings parties together as a collective while still respecting their
individual claims. Moreover, the monitor can unburden creditors from their need to investigate the
debtor on an individual basis, through its own policing and reporting on the debtor’s affairs,
reducing associated costs. This function is especially beneficial because it produces information
that the court will defer to when making its final decisions.357 As such, the monitor allays creditor
concerns over transparency, providing a sense of security to the process. 358 The monitor is “the
eyes and ears of the court,”359 and advises the court in determining “the fairness of any proposed
plan of arrangement and on orders sought by parties.”360 One experienced monitor explains that
the typical monitor analyzes the debtor with regards to its past and projected financial trajectory,
considers available options for increasing the business’ viability, and studies the debtor’s
competitors, its capital structure, and respective market.361 On the basis of these considerations,
the monitor then prepares its reports and recommendations.362
Since its creation by the courts in the 1980s, and following its codification in 1997, the
monitor’s role “has developed from one of passive observer to one of active participant.”363
Beginning as a supervisory role that was primarily concerned with disseminating information and
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extending the courts’ presence beyond the courtroom, the monitor has become more involved in
mediation and negotiation, actively stepping into its capacity as an expert with an increasing focus
on advising and leading the process.364
The careful crafting of the role over time has resulted in a wide range of duties and
responsibilities. It has been remarked that “in the majority of cases, the monitor’s role and
influence extends beyond that of watchdog.”365 Indeed, the broad authority conferred on the court
by section 11 of the CCAA has led parties to request “an expansion of monitors’ powers to cover
numerous types of duties in a variety of circumstances.”366 For instance, the information
intermediary now also typically advises and makes recommendations based on that information,
usually in the form of monitor’s reports.367 This advisory role consists of “providing business
judgment, negotiation skills and financial advice.”368
When a monitor is endowed with broader authority, it is referred to as a “super monitor,”369
and its multifaceted role has been likened to trying to wear multiple hats, often at once.370 This is
especially common in mid-market cases, where “the monitor usually has to be active for two major
reasons: (1) the debtor may not have the management horsepower to direct a restructuring, and (2)
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cost — the debtor cannot afford to pay financial advisors, legal counsel, and the monitor.”371 In
the nearly five decades since the CCAA was revived,372 the matters and parties with which it was
enacted to contend have grown far more complex.373 The monitor has increasingly been molded
into an expanded version of its original watchdog role,374 as the expert called in to make sense of
and guide the parties through these growing intricacies.375 It has an established—and
respected376—status as independent expert, and its reports are not only viewed with credibility by
the court but are often difficult to successfully challenge.377
The monitor is not only the court’s appointed officer, it acts as a guide to the debtor, and
safeguards the interests of creditors as a whole.378 One author states that “[i]n taking on the larger
role of overseeing the restructuring process, monitors become advisors to the debtor company, but
are also protectors of the creditors and other stakeholders, and finally, must be the “eyes and ears”
Peter P Farkas, “Defining (and refining) the role of the Monitor” (2010) 72 CBR (5th) 159 [Retrieved from
WestlawNext Canada]; See also Sarra, “Ethics”, supra note 323 at 184 (“[i]n small and mid-market workouts under
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372
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of the court, all at once.”379 It must carry out these responsibilities in accordance with
impartiality,380 a duty to act in the best interests of all parties,381 a fiduciary duty,382 and an overall
duty of good faith.383 The balancing required to juggle the monitor’s multiple roles and adhere to
the above obligations can lead to actual and perceived conflicts of interest.384
PART II – DIFFICULTIES WITH THE ROLE OF THE MONITOR
The monitor’s role is burdened with the pressure to stay neutral, in the midst of multiple
clashing interests, its growing responsibilities, and the persuasiveness of the parties. Describing
the monitor’s uneasy role within the CCAA scheme, Knowles writes:
Applying for protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act… is similar to
a sick, but not terminally ill, patient going to the hospital emergency room… The Monitor
is instrumental in assessing the treatment options and their application. However, where a
Monitor takes on conflicting roles in a CCAA proceeding, he or she may wind up acting
as both healthcare professional and undertaker, which raises the question of whether a
Monitor can, in fact, successfully carry out these roles in tandem.385

The most basic example of a seemingly inherent conflict in the monitor’s role is that it is expected
to “provide an independent assessment of the business and financial affairs of the debtor that can
be relied upon by the court and by the creditors,”386 while simultaneously acting as a guide to the
debtor through the proceedings.387 The danger here is of helping the debtor to navigate the
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proceedings without becoming or being perceived as its representative.388 This concern is explored
below in further detail.
(i) The Debtor & Monitor Relationship
As noted earlier, even prior to 1997, the monitor was commonly the debtor’s auditor. This
practice was controversial because it is hard to contemplate a better example of perceived bias than
a pre-existing relationship. The 1997 CCAA addition of section 11.7 recognized this conflict,
stating that:
11.7(2) Except with the permission of the court and on any conditions that the court may
impose, no trustee may be appointed as monitor in relation to a company
(a) if the trustee is or, at any time during the two preceding years, was…
(iii) the auditor, accountant or legal counsel, or a partner or an employee of the auditor,
accountant or legal counsel, of the company.389

Curiously, the practice of courts is typically to accept the debtor’s auditor as monitor appointee,390
usually with the justification that “[i]n many cases, the monitor also acts as financial advisor to the
debtor, and this tends to make the CCAA process cheaper and faster.”391
Cost savings is often heralded as the primary rationale for this practice,392 though potential
pitfalls may be serious. For instance, the former auditor now monitor may be tasked with
scrutinizing transactions that it participated in as advisor prior to the monitor appointment.393
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Moreover, the timing of the initial order, under which the monitor is appointed,394 can work
against creditors.395 Not only is it common that “most creditors are not in court at the time of the
initial order,” but “courts now expect [that] a "proposed" monitor's report be filed at the time of
the initial order.”396 This means that the debtor’s monitor appointee has already been working with
the debtor,397 which raises concern of possible bias. It should be noted that although the CCAA is
traditionally a debtor-driven process, the rising trend of creditor-driven CCAAs suggests that the
concern over monitors being too pro-debtor may be somewhat downplayed.398 Creditor-driven
CCAAs, however, raise their own concerns, wherein certain creditors and creditor groups—
typically stronger, secured creditors—may themselves be unfairly favoured by the monitor.399
Looking back before the immediate proceedings, “the depth and duration”400 of the relationship
may also strongly suggest a conflict that outweighs cost savings.401 This potential difficulty is not
exclusive to one party, as conflict may stem from a “relationship or prior engagement(s) or
involvement with an insolvent company, its creditors, shareholders, board of directors or other
stakeholders.”402
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At the same time, an auditor’s familiarity with the debtor company is also considered one
of the justifications for appointing it as the monitor.403 There are a variety of synergies potentially
gained from appointing a debtor’s former auditor to the role of monitor. For example, “the auditor
knows the corporation inside and out, has already established working relationships with
management, and is cheaper to employ… [and] can also utilize his knowledge of the firm to
formulate a restructuring.”404 Likewise, the monitor’s expertise is crucial,405 and when coupled
with knowledge of and an existing relationship with the debtor, “it may be easier to overcome
management’s concerns about filing.”406 The expanded “super monitor” is also a consideration
here, as “if it is appropriate for the monitor in substance to act as financial advisor as well as a
watchdog then the concern about the auditor being too close to the debtor’s management appears
to be irrelevant.”407 Yet if the monitor is too close to the debtor’s management, it may find its view
on restructuring options narrowed. Moreover, the flexibility of the monitor’s role “confuses the
conflict analysis,” because debtor’s auditors have traditionally been considered unsuitable to act
as receivers, a function which monitors may, in effect, fulfill in many cases. 408 Additionally,
expanding the duties of monitors—i.e., into super monitors—would necessarily magnify the
potential for actual and perceived conflicts.409 Notwithstanding the foregoing pros and cons, it is
generally accepted that so long as there is full and transparent disclosure of such past
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relationships,410 and no “material objection from interested parties,”411 the court will approve the
auditor as monitor. As this decision occurs at the outset of proceedings, it does not necessarily
reflect changing attitudes as proceedings continue, and perceived bias(es) that may or may not
arise.412
(ii) The Monitor & the Sales Process
One of the more controversial practices that has emerged in the past few decades is the use
of the CCAA to authorize sales of substantially all of the debtor’s assets.413 The monitor is at the
center of these CCAA sales, as it is responsible for providing the court with a fairness and
reasonableness opinion.414 Beyond this statutory obligation, the monitor typically plays an active
role in the negotiations leading to the sale,415 and may have even proposed the sale.416 On one
hand, the monitor’s involvement can benefit creditors because monitors “can use the threat of
withholding their approval to negotiate with the debtor.”417 On the other hand, this can lead to
private negotiations between debtor and monitor, which not only creates a perception of bias, but
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“has the odd result that one of the key negotiating parties has no direct economic stake in the
outcome of the case.”418 Further, the monitor is principally an information intermediary, which
means that it will be required to be “on the one hand, an architect of the plan and of the meeting
process, and on the other hand… [present] the merits of the plan and of the meeting process to
approve it.”419 In any event, the monitor’s approval can all but ensure court approval of the sale.
However, although the monitor’s analysis carries great weight with the court, its value also
depends heavily on how independent the analysis is.420
This is further compounded if a “dual-track process” is pursued, whereby a restructuring
plan is formulated for a company under CCAA protection, while the debtor also solicits offers for
its assets, all under the guidance of the monitor.421 This might produce a “diametric conflict,” given
that the monitor would be attempting to keep the business operating while also seeking to sell off
its assets.422 On the other hand, in order to preserve going concern value pending a potential
purchase of the debtor company, the monitor must ensure the business is operational.423 Otherwise,
liquidation of the assets may result in piecemeal sales for lesser value. In Nelson,424 the court
ordered that the monitor be replaced because the monitor’s affiliate had served as a financial
advisor to the debtor for two years prior to the CCAA proceedings.425 The affiliate had advised in
the structuring of the proposed sale. The court stated that the monitor had “been front row and
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centre in the very sales process… and has engaged in negotiations on behalf of [the debtor]
Nelson.”426 In this case. the court was careful to say that no actual conflict arose. 427 The case is
important, however, because it signals a high-bar for impartiality and the monitor’s independence.
Indeed, the court in Winalta highlighted the need to avoid any perception of—and of course
actual—bias, in order to safeguard public faith in the insolvency system.428 Nevertheless, the dualtrack process, and accompanying two-fold monitor role, is subject to the contexts of each
individual case. Although it appears an inherent conflict, if the goal of the CCAA is maximizing
value for creditors (and other stakeholders), then this dual role might be necessary.429
Alternatively, “if the monitor is highly involved in developing a plan of arrangement or a
reorganization strategy, the monitor may be viewed as an advocate for the plan and the perception
of the monitor’s independence can be threatened.”430
(iii) Multiple, Divergent Interests
One of the justifications for collective insolvency regimes like the CCAA is that they help
to resolve a collective action problem.431 Thomas Jackson succinctly defines the collective action
problem in the insolvency context:
Each creditor, unless assured of the other's cooperation, has an incentive to take advantage
of individual collection remedies, and to do so before the other creditor acts. Unless each
creditor individually attempts to "beat out" the other, that creditor will fare worse than the
other. Yet this race not only creates costs for the individual creditors… it is also likely to
lead to a premature termination of a debtor's business, because each creditor will consider
only that creditor's own advantage from racing, instead of the disadvantages imposed on
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creditors collectively. Thus, each creditor must participate in collectively non-optimal
"advantage-taking" simply to avoid being taken advantage of.432

The CCAA is not exempt from this problem, and, as previously mentioned, the appointment of the
monitor is intended to provide part of the legislative scheme’s solution to the collective action
problem.433 Yet arguably when the monitor is thrown into the mix, an altogether new obstacle
arises.
Put simply, not only are debtors and creditors typically—though not always—at cross
purposes, but creditors “are not a homogenous group.”434 How then is the monitor, with its
accompanying baggage of duties and responsibilities, supposed to act in the best interests of all
these parties?435 Ideally, the monitor is a neutral expert, appointed by the court because of its
“expertise in collecting and processing financial and economic data.”436 It wields this expertise in
protecting the expression of creditor democracy, by assessing a plan that a majority has voted for,
and presenting its reasonableness to the court.437 This ideal may be muddied by the reality that the
monitor cannot please all parties, and “on occasion, one or more stakeholders will disagree with
the monitor's recommendation and will have complaints about the process, and perceive bias and
other failings on the part of the monitor, even where there are none.”438 Given that perceived bias
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is just as deadly as actual bias in this context,439 even the appearance of a monitor siding with or
acting for one or more parties can be determinative.440 Though cases where monitors were found
to have acted in conflict are few,441 the divergence of interests is nonetheless in constant tension
with the monitor’s numerous duties. One direction that courts have taken—as will be discussed
directly below—is to hold that a monitor’s neutrality is malleable.
(iv) Malleable Neutrality
In Winalta, a comprehensive judicial discussion of a monitor’s duties, the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench said that bias—whether perceived or actual—is to be avoided through the
monitor’s exercise of its professional neutrality.442 The Ontario Superior Court permitted space for
straying from strict neutrality in its 2017 decision in Urbancorp Cumberland 2 GP Inc, (Re),443
stating that the monitor is a neutral party until or unless granted the kind of powers that necessitate
advocating a particular position.444 As will be seen in the below cases, the court opined that
neutrality may only be subverted in pursuing facilitation of the restructuring.445 The court in
Urbancorp decided against allowing the monitor to pursue an action, because it did not find it to
advance the restructuring purpose and served only to direct attention to a disagreement between
creditor groups.446 The court explicitly stressed that, while “[c]reditors are free to spend their
money and face the consequences,” the monitor “acts with the imprimatur the Court… [and] is far
more constrained.”447
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In 2017, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ernst & Young Inc v Essar Global Fund Limited,448
explained that a monitor is neutral and only takes positions “in support of a restructuring
purpose.”449 The court observed that a CCAA trial judge’s supervision of the monitor is enough to
safeguard against biased or otherwise unfair conduct.450 The court in Essar did not specifically
address the lower court’s statement that “[w]hile it is the case that normally a Monitor, as an officer
of the court, is to be neutral in its role and not take sides in favour of one stakeholder against
another, there are exceptions.”451 The lower court was referring specifically to section 23(1)(k),452
which as previously noted,453 grants courts the broad discretion to give the monitor additional
powers. In Essar, the appellate court looked instead at section 23(1)(c),454 which the court noted
is likely to “frequently place a monitor at odds with the shareholders or other stakeholders.”455
Both courts seem to arrive at the same place, which coincides with Urbancorp: a monitor is neutral
unless a court decides it may sidestep neutrality to help the restructuring along.
The Quebec Court of Appeal provides the most recent decision on monitor neutrality, in
the context of a contest over whether the monitor in question could be given the power to pursue
an action in the name of creditors.456 In that case, as in Essar, the court defended a monitor’s ability
to take a position on the basis of section 23(1)(c).457 However, the court went further than both the
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lower and appellate court in the Ontario cases, stating that: “[a]s long as the monitor is objective
and not biased and takes positions based on reasoned criteria to further legitimate CCAA purposes,
it now appears inescapable that the neutrality it must maintain is attenuated.” 458 Thus, Aquadis
provides a firm summary of the common theme in these cases, that the court decides if and when
the monitor may “drop its cloak of neutrality.”459 If neutrality is malleable, what does this say of
the monitor’s strongest duty, that of a fiduciary for all parties involved?
(v) Fiduciary Duty
At the heart of the role is its fiduciary duty. It is the most important duty, because it cements
the understanding of the monitor as being ‘one for all’: the eyes and ears of the court.460 Although
crucial, “[a]n under-explored aspect of the conflicts issue is precisely to whom the fiduciary
obligation of monitors is owed.”461 In an early case, prior to the 1997 codification of the role, the
New Brunswick Court of Appeal maintained that the monitor owes a fiduciary duty to all parties.462
In the 2002 case of Re Hickman Equipment (1985) Ltd,463 the court considered the monitor’s role
as being similar to a receiver, and thus a receiver’s fiduciary duty formed the standard for the
monitor’s own.464 The Alberta Queen’s Bench made the same comparison in Re 843504,465 where
it clarified that the court-appointed officer “owes a duty to treat all creditors reasonably and fairly,”
and, “[l]ike a court-appointed receiver or liquidator, its duties are those of a fiduciary.” 466 This
comparison is not without merit, because as mentioned previously, a court-appointed receiver—
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as opposed to a privately appointed receiver—is a court officer “and acts in a fiduciary capacity in
relation to all parties who have an interest in the assets under receivership.”467 Yet the monitor
functions as a much further extension of the court’s supervisory capacity, and thus “serves a
broader statutory objective.”468
In 2002, the Ontario Superior Court in Laidlaw stated that the monitor “must objectively
look out for and be concerned for the interests of all stakeholders… but looked at in a reasonable
way… there must be an air of reality to the analysis.”469 The court in Laidlaw did not clarify what
constitutes an air of reality, nor did it provide guidance for this suggested analysis. The Ontario
Court of Appeal set out limits for the monitor’s fiduciary duty in the 2006 case of Ivaco Inc (Re).470
In Ivaco, the court refused to recognize a fiduciary duty owed to pension beneficiaries, arguing
that the monitor’s powers, though expanded beyond those in section 11.7(3),471 did not rise to the
level of equating its duty to the fiduciary duty owed by the relevant companies.472 The Ontario
Court of Appeal in Essar cited Ivaco for the proposition that “a monitor is not necessarily a
fiduciary; it only becomes one if the court specifically assigns it a responsibility to which fiduciary
duties attach.”473
In the 2011 seminal case on a monitor’s fiduciary duty, Winalta¸ the Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench did not consider limitations when laying out the essentials of the duty. The court
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stated that the monitor’s fiduciary duty is owed to the stakeholders,474 and is paramount to
maintaining “the public's confidence in the insolvency system.”475 In that case, the monitor was
accused of favouring one creditor over others, providing it with a report not disclosed to other
creditors.476 The court offered clarification about monitors that wear multiple hats, stating “there
may be heightened sensitivity about the work of a CCAA monitor who has chosen to wear two
hats… due to an honestly held suspicion about where the monitor's loyalties lie rather than out of
spite or malice.”477 The court’s suggestion was that monitors should always operate with
transparency, eliminating “[s]ecrecy [which] breeds suspicion.”478 The court in Nelson followed
Winalta, stressing that “[i]t is critical that in this role a monitor be independent of the parties and
be seen to be independent.”479
As may be evident from the foregoing, there is some discrepancy with regards to the
understanding of the monitor’s fiduciary duty. Is a fiduciary duty owed to all parties, or only in
respect of the parties with whom the monitor is engaging? Does the monitor always owe fiduciary
duties to the stakeholders in a restructuring, or do the monitor’s fiduciary duties only arise when
the court grants powers to the monitor that by their nature attract fiduciary obligations? Given the
immense responsibility that a fiduciary duty typically carries, it seems odd that some decisions
ascribe it to monitors automatically, while other decisions only do so depending on the
circumstances. Similarly, the evolution, or devolution, of the duty is strange, where pre-1997 cases
recognized a duty to all parties and recent cases restrict its application. The Supreme Court of
Canada has yet to clarify the monitor’s fiduciary duty, so the latest pronouncement is the Ontario
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Court of Appeal’s limited view of the duty in Essar. This issue begs clarification, for if the
monitor’s neutrality is malleable, can it be said that a monitor is truly independent? This question
will be further explored in Chapter Three.
PART III – EVALUATING EXISTING CHECKS & BALANCES
While the above concerns are not without merit, “the overwhelming evidence from the case
law is that monitors are highly ethical and skilled professionals; and there is no question that they
have contributed significantly to the reputation of Canada’s restructuring regime.”480 The simplest
assurance that one need not worry over the monitor’s impartiality is that it has no financial stake
in whether there is a restructuring or liquidation, or any payment of claims.481 While monitors are
paid for their services, their fee is a recognized payment under the Act, and does not typically
attract concerns of bias.482 Notwithstanding this uncontroversial aspect of proceedings, monitors
and their firms represent a business, one which looks to establish long-term relationships and a
respectable client base.483 There is therefore the possibility that underlying these appointments is
not only the history between the parties, but also the “the prospect or hope of future
engagements.”484
Monitors must also be trustees and licensed professionals,485 subject to a variety of ethical
guidelines.486 For instance, monitors must adhere to the Canadian Association of Insolvency and
Restructuring Professionals (CAIRP) Rules of Professional Conduct.487 The CAIRP rules
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generally stipulate that insolvency professionals must remain objective, and are to dispel any
influence or relationship which would tarnish that objectivity or give rise to a conflict of interest.488
These rules are also presented as a minimum standard, meaning insolvency professionals are
expected to go above and beyond these ethical guidelines in practice. 489 Aside from these
professional obligations, the monitor is also subject to a variety of checks and balances within the
CCAA regime, geared towards safeguarding independence.490
One of the provisions in the Act that functions to protect the integrity of CCAA proceedings
is section 18.6, which came into force in 2019.491 This is the duty of good faith, which applies to
all ‘interested persons’492 in the proceedings, and is also an organizing principle at common law
when entering into and performing contracts.493 Good faith generally requires a party to be “honest,
candid, forthright or reasonable” in their contractual performance.494 When applied to the monitor,
good faith promotes transparency, which is crucial for quelling any suspicions of bias/conflict. 495
Monitors are also subject to direct oversight by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy,
which is responsible for investigation of any complaints of monitor misconduct.496
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Similarly, courts are given extensive powers of discretion over proceedings under section
11 of the CCAA.497 While they typically limit themselves to a supervisory role,498 courts have the
ability to use orders so as to proactively police the monitor (and other parties).499 These courts also
tend to be highly specialized commercial lists,500 with substantial expertise in CCAA matters. This
affords CCAA judges a unique role in protecting the process.
Market forces also play a role in encouraging monitors to practice in an efficient and
ethically professional manner.501 Those insolvency professionals with a reputation for impartiality
and effective problem-solving skills will naturally be chosen over their less-favoured
colleagues.502 Such monitors will balance a passive observer role with that of a more active
adversarial role. The latter promotes “an adversarial environment in which information is brought
to the forum” by multiple parties, because the monitor is constantly holding the debtor accountable
for dealing with other parties to the process with transparency.503
This transparency can be further promoted, in certain cases, by the appointment of a Chief
Restructuring Officer (CRO). This is usually done in the initial order,504 which sets out that the
CRO is “to steer the insolvent firm through the negotiation for a plan and the restructuring
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process.”505 Depending on the circumstances, the CRO may assume some of the functions of the
CEO or board of directors, otherwise it takes on enhanced senior management responsibilities.506
The main advantage of the CRO is that it is typically a restructuring expert, and it brings a fresh
perspective into proceedings.507 Additionally, as a court-appointed officer, the CRO is subject to
direct judicial supervision, as opposed to internal accountability measures typical between a
debtor’s board of directors and management.508 However, many of the same issues already
discussed which plague the monitor also affect the CRO, namely bias and an unclear fiduciary
duty.509 The CRO is also not required to be a licensed professional, nor is it subject to oversight
by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.510 CRO fees can also be performance-driven,
which can cause it to favour some stakeholders’ interests to the exclusion of others, potentially
creating a perception of bias.511 All of this is to say, while a CRO may be appropriate and a great
boon in some cases, it is not without its own imperfections, some of which may outweigh its
positive effects.
PART IV - CONCLUSION
The monitor is a key component of the CCAA restructuring regime. Its role as agent of the
court, combined with its expertise, make it an important leadership figure for all stakeholders, and
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a guide for the debtor and the court. The monitor is involved at the initial order, in the planning
and negotiating of the restructuring, and finally at the court approval stage. It steers the debtor
through the complexities of proceedings, and ensures that stakeholders are adequately informed.
However, these functions and responsibilities may spread the monitor thin, particularly as regards
its independence and ethics.512 The monitor’s neutrality and fiduciary duty are not entirely clear.
Likewise, while there is a code of ethics the monitor must follow, and a requirement that it proceed
in good faith, the nature of the CCAA process still allows room for bias. A monitor caught up in a
two-track process is but one example. Arguably, the ethical framework of an insolvency
professional serving as monitor would be strengthened by a clearly defined legal duty
encompassing CAIRP guidelines and best business practices. The underexplored source of the
monitor’s impartiality needs a closer examination and reformulation. Both goals are discussed in
the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE
Introduction
In common law systems, individuals who are vested with the power to act on behalf of
others are obligated under law to act with the highest integrity and selflessness. Where this
relationship requires extensive responsibilities,513 those vested therewith are called fiduciaries, of
which one of the most underexplored examples is the monitor under the CCAA.514 The monitor
owes a fiduciary duty to all parties involved in a CCAA case,515 and yet its current role sometimes
necessitates that it deviate from the strict requirement of neutrality.516 This curious practice may
have the ill effect that the monitor favours some parties over others, constituting a significant
departure from the strict impartiality supposedly imposed by fiduciary obligations.
This Chapter proposes changes to the monitor’s role, that are intended to maximize its
utility while respecting its duties as a fiduciary. This necessarily requires consideration of fiduciary
law first principles, as well as the question of whether the monitor can effectively perform the
duties of a fiduciary. Accordingly, Part I of this Chapter examines the law of fiduciary duties in
Canada. Next follows a brief synthesis of how a monitor’s fiduciary duty is currently understood
by Canadian courts and commentators. Then, in Part II, I will examine the fiduciary duties of the
court-appointed receiver and Canadian directors and officers, focusing on their similarities in
balancing the interests of various parties. A further comparison will be made by examining the
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Unsecured Creditors’ Committee, itself a fiduciary in the American counterpart to the CCAA:
Chapter 11.517 Once these comparisons are made, I will present suggested solutions to monitor
conflict of interest in Part III. I will argue in Part IV that the monitor owes a fiduciary duty to the
CCAA process, beholden to the CCAA’s multiple objectives. My proposal is for codification of
this duty within the CCAA, such that the monitor would owe a duty to the process, abiding by the
standard of fairness and the pursuit of CCAA objectives, in the best interests of the stakeholder
collective. I will conclude in Part V with some comments about the need to ensure that the role of
the monitor is properly reconfigured so as to effectively and proactively avoid conflicts of interest,
while serving all parties to a CCAA proceeding impartially and fairly.
PART I – FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE
The definition of a fiduciary in Canada is imprecise.518 In simple terms, “where one party
has placed its ‘trust and confidence’ in another and the latter has accepted—expressly or by
operation of law—to act in a manner consistent with the reposing of such ‘trust and confidence,’
a fiduciary relationship has been established.”519 While a fiduciary stands in a position of trust—
sometimes referred to as a trustee—and the duty flows from a beneficiary, these terms merely
reflect the roots of fiduciary law (i.e., in trust law), and do not necessitate the presence of a formal
trust.520 The fiduciary is held to the highest standards regarding its conduct with respect to the
beneficiary. It owes a duty “of utmost good faith (uberminae fides), which itself imports a
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requirement that the fiduciary act towards the beneficiary with a heightened sense of loyalty and
fidelity.”521 The mechanics of a fiduciary duty are as follows:
one should think of the fiduciary relationship as a transfer of powers from the beneficiary,
B, to the fiduciary, F. The powers transferred by B to F originally belonged to the former
and, in fact, still do. B has merely loaned the powers to F within the ambit of their fiduciary
relationship; they do not become F's own possession. F is duty-bound to use these powers
in the same manner as B would, subject to any constraints B imposes on their use. F may
not exceed these imposed limits or else [may] be liable for breach of duty; the purpose of
F's duty is to act within the parameters established by B through the latter's transfer of
powers, [and] not exceed them.522

Before such requirements are imposed, a fiduciary obligation must be found, which is not a
straightforward analysis.523 In Guerin v R,524 the Supreme Court of Canada explained that
identifying a fiduciary relationship depends on “the nature of the relationship, not the specific
category of actor involved.”525 The Court then went on to set out three useful considerations for
determining the existence of a fiduciary relation in Frame v Smith,526 which it adopted in
International Corona Resources Ltd v Lac Minerals Ltd:527
Relationships in which a fiduciary obligation have been imposed seem to possess three
general characteristics: (1) The fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or
power. (2) The fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or discretion so as to affect
the beneficiary's legal or practical interests. (3) The beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to
or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power.528

The analysis begins with the facts of the particular relationship being examined in each case,529 as
opposed to rigidly applying pre-existing categories of fiduciary duty.530 Such categories serve as
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guides but are not the only places where a fiduciary obligation may be found.531 Two decades after
Lac Minerals, the Court grappled with the still lingering difficulties surrounding the determination
of a fiduciary duty in Galambos v Perez,532 and Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society.533
Galambos dealt with whether vulnerability of the beneficiary —i.e., the third characteristic
in the Frame/Lac Minerals analysis—is determinative of a fiduciary obligation. In that case, the
Court stated that “to assert that the protection of the vulnerable is the role of fiduciary law puts the
matter too broadly.”534 Instead, the proper analysis is to look at “the position of the parties that
results from the relationship which gives rise to the fiduciary duty [rather] than with the respective
positions of the parties before they enter into the relationship.”535 Moreover, the Court clarified
the concept of existing categories of fiduciary relationships, which it referred to as per se fiduciary
relationships. These “are considered to give rise to fiduciary obligations because of their inherent
purpose or their presumed factual or legal incidents.”536 Importantly, the Court noted that in some
instances, such as in a solicitor-client relationship, “not every legal claim…will give rise to a claim
for a breach of fiduciary duty.”537 The difficulty in such cases lies in discerning which
responsibilities flow from the fiduciary relationship and which do not.538
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In order to have a fiduciary obligation, there must be “an undertaking of loyalty,”539 and
discretionary power to affect the beneficiary’s interests.540 The undertaking of loyalty concerns
acting in the best interests of the beneficiary,541 while the beneficiary’s interests are defined as any
“legal or vital practical interests.”542 Both these requirements are restatements of the Frame/Lac
Minerals characteristics, i.e., scope for discretion of power by the fiduciary and the ability
therewith to affect the beneficiary. The Supreme Court also noted that fiduciary obligations will
only be found where the fiduciary is found to “have expressly or impliedly undertaken them.”543
Importantly, in determining whether there has been an implied undertaking, the Court says it will
consider “professional norms, industry or other common practices and whether the alleged
fiduciary induced the other party into relying on the fiduciary's loyalty.”544 Like the undertaking,
the discretionary power is also to be scrutinized if it involves the giving of advice, which “will not
necessarily on its own support the existence of an ad hoc fiduciary duty; its absence, however,
negates the existence of such a duty.”545
In Elder Advocates, the Court reaffirmed its position on the insufficiency of vulnerability
as a determinative factor of fiduciary obligations.546 It further classified the Frame/Lac Minerals
characteristics as “hallmarks,”547 and restated that “the evidence must show that the alleged
539
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fiduciary gave an undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of a beneficiary.”548
Expounding on the meaning of a beneficiary’s interests, the Court stated that these may range from
property interests to other legally recognized interests.549 For instances falling outside of the
recognized categories of fiduciary relations, the Court provided the following framework:
for an ad hoc fiduciary duty to arise, the claimant must show, in addition to the vulnerability
arising from the relationship as described by Wilson J. in Frame; (1) an undertaking by the
alleged fiduciary to act in the best interests of the alleged beneficiary or beneficiaries; (2)
a defined person or class of persons vulnerable to a fiduciary's control (the beneficiary or
beneficiaries); and (3) a legal or substantial practical interest of the beneficiary or
beneficiaries that stands to be adversely affected by the alleged fiduciary's exercise of
discretion or control.550

The above is a synthesis of the Frame/Lac Minerals characteristics and their restatement in
Galambos. “Vulnerability” points to the discretionary power and its potential to impact the
beneficiary. The essential element of an undertaking—mentioned in Norberg, Hodgkinson, and
Galambos551—is defined alongside clarification as to whom it is given, and the need for it to affect
such parties’ interests. Finally, the Court is careful to underscore vulnerability as a result, stating
that the effect of the fiduciary’s actions must have the possibility of affecting the beneficiary
negatively. This is the reason typically cited for invoking equity to protect the beneficiary.552
Fiduciary obligations thus function to protect beneficiaries by imposing a high standard on
fiduciaries as regards their responsibilities.553 Recall that a fiduciary must act with the

548

Ibid at para 30, citing Galambos, supra note 532 at paras 66, 71, 77–78, Hodgkinson, supra note 518 at 409–10.
Ibid at para 35 (the Court also noted that “[i]n the traditional categories of fiduciary relationship, the nature of the
relationship itself defines the interest at stake… [whereas] a party seeking to establish an ad hoc duty must be able to
point to an identifiable legal or vital practical interest that is at stake” ibid).
550
Ibid at para 36.
551
See supra note 539 and accompanying text.
552
See e.g., Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, supra note 513 ch 1 at 3; Lac Minerals, supra note 518; Rotman, supra note
518 at 91 (“[i]t is precisely because fiduciary relationships create vulnerability in beneficiaries, rather than vice-versa,
that fiduciary doctrine seeks to protect beneficiaries through the imposition of its harsh sanctions” ibid).
553
Ellis, Fairbairn & McKendry, ibid ch 1 at 5 (“[i]t is clear that the law imposes an extremely high degree of fidelity”
ibid).
549

84

beneficiary’s best interests in mind, and any departure from this is a breach of the duty. 554 Under
this reasoning, fiduciaries must not only avoid actual but possible conflicts of interest.555 This can
be especially complicated when it comes to certain professions, particularly where fiduciaries may
act without a full understanding of their legal obligations to beneficiaries.556
PART II – COMPARING DIFFERENT TYPES OF FIDUCIARIES
Professionals engaged in providing financial advice, (e.g. accountants and investment
counselors),557 are examples of occupations, that courts tend to consider as involving ad hoc
fiduciary relationships.558 This is a result of the advisory nature of the relationship between the
professional and their clients/beneficiaries, wherein they use their special knowledge/skills to steer
their clients towards a particular course of action.559 The consequences of misdirection via faulty
or misguided advice or actions by such fiduciaries therefore directly impacts the beneficiaries’
financial interests. The Supreme Court of Canada in Hodgkinson stressed the importance of a
factual analysis in determining when these types of occupations trigger fiduciary obligations:
“where a fiduciary duty is claimed in the context of a financial advisory relationship, it is at all
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events a question of fact as to whether the parties' relationship was such as to give rise to a fiduciary
duty on the part of the advisor.”560
(i) Fiduciary Duty of Receivers
Another example of such an occupation, within the context of insolvency law, is that of the
receiver.561 Privately appointed receivers act as agents of their appointees, (most often a secured
creditor), to whom they owe a fiduciary duty,562 though they “may be regarded as acting in an
independent capacity in much the same way as a court-appointed receiver when enforcing the
security interest.”563 As opposed to a privately appointed receiver,564 “[a] court-appointed receiver
is an officer of the court and acts in a fiduciary capacity in relation to all parties who have an
interest in the assets under receivership.”565 The court-appointed receiver, like the CCAA monitor,
may also encounter challenges in carrying out its duty to the parties, whose interests typically
conflict.566 Interestingly, the receiver’s fiduciary obligation and impartiality are malleable,567 such
that “despite a fiduciary duty owed universally to all parties to a receivership, the court-appointed
receiver will not be hampered in the carrying out of his responsibilities under his appointment.”568
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In this respect, the receiver and the monitor share common ground,569 yet it is unclear exactly what
this means in the face of conflicting parties, obligations, and what is supposed to be a strict standard
in fiduciary doctrine. A different approach has been taken by courts in interpreting the fiduciary
duties of directors and officers when faced with diverging interests.
(ii) Fiduciary Duty of Directors & Officers
Directors and officers of Canadian companies are under fiduciary obligations, to be carried
out “with a view to the best interests of the corporation.”570 Much like the receiver and monitor,
the duty is not owed to any party in particular, but rather to the collective that is the
“corporation”.571 As Neumueller puts it, “[t]he objective of the fiduciary duty is to deter directors
[and officers] from putting their own interests before those of the corporation… [they are] obliged
by their fiduciary duty to act in good faith.”572 Referring to the Canada Business Corporations
Act, (CBCA), the Supreme Court of Canada summarized the essential components of the duty in
Peoples Department Stores Inc (Trustee of) v Wise:573
The statutory fiduciary duty requires directors and officers to act honestly and in good faith
vis-à-vis the corporation. They must respect the trust and confidence that have been
reposed in them to manage the assets of the corporation in pursuit of the realization of the
objects of the corporation. They must avoid conflicts of interest with the
corporation. They must avoid abusing their position to gain personal benefit. They must
maintain the confidentiality of information they acquire by virtue of their
position. Directors and officers must serve the corporation selflessly, honestly and
loyally.574

The various groups and individuals that make up a corporation do not always share similar
interests, particularly when it faces insolvency. In this respect, directors and officers are expected
569
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to always maintain their duty to the corporation.575 The Supreme Court of Canada has specifically
noted that when the interests of the stakeholders making up the corporation clash, “[w]here the
conflict involves the interests of the corporation, it falls to the directors [and officers] of the
corporation to resolve them in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of
the corporation, viewed as a good corporate citizen.”576 So long as directors and officers have
treated stakeholders fairly, acted in good faith, and considered all relevant factors, they have
upheld their fiduciary obligation to the corporation.577 This analysis provides an interesting parallel
to the monitor’s fiduciary duty, given the similarities in balancing multiple conflicting interests. If
directors and officers are acting for a broader purpose, vis-à-vis the best interests of the corporation
over those of individual stakeholders, perhaps the monitor’s fiduciary duty can be better
understood by framing it in similar terms.
The problem with this is that monitors owe their fiduciary duty to all stakeholders, and not
to the best interests of—albeit a legal “person”578—an inanimate entity. The group of creditors and
stakeholders that hold claims in an insolvency situation are often referred to as the collective.
Perhaps the monitor’s duty to this collective is not so different from the fiduciary duty of directors
and officers. Can a monitor’s duty then be more clearly defined if it is said to be in the interests of
a collective of stakeholders? Does this allow it to consider but not necessarily act in the best
interests of individual stakeholders? I will return to this comparison in my reform proposal, as it
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may provide an effective alternative for perceiving the duty despite the differences between the
two.
(iii) Fiduciary Duty of the Monitor
Like the court-appointed receiver, the monitor’s impartiality is not definite. Rather, it may
“drop its cloak of neutrality,”579 if that is required in order to pursue CCAA objectives.580 While
the monitor was considered a fiduciary even before the role was codified in the 1997 CCAA
amendments,581 there are some cases that question whether this is an automatic attribute.582 In the
seminal case on a monitor’s fiduciary duty, Winalta,583 the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench stated
that monitors owe a fiduciary duty to all stakeholders,584 which duty acts as a bulwark for public
confidence in the Canadian insolvency system.585 This follows the line of cases that consider the
monitor a fiduciary from the outset.586 Yet the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ivaco and then in Essar
held that a monitor only becomes a fiduciary if it is assigned a particular responsibility that requires
the imposition of fiduciary obligations.587 This echoes the analysis in Lac Minerals588 and
Galambos,589 whereby not all of a—in that case a per se—fiduciary’s responsibilities to
beneficiaries are fiduciary in nature,590 and claims for breach of fiduciary duty must be founded
on those responsibilities which impose fiduciary obligations.591 In other words, fiduciaries carry
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out duties that attract fiduciary standards of behaviour, along with other, more banal
responsibilities. Yet this distinction only applies if it is first determined that a monitor is a
fiduciary. The above cases suggest that this is not necessarily always so.
One important question to ask is whether court-appointed officers are inherent or per se
fiduciaries. Previously, we observed that courts have consistently stated that court-appointed
receivers “must act fairly and honestly as a fiduciary on behalf of all parties with an interest in the
debtor's property and undertaking.”592 Indeed, it seems to be a given that court-appointed receivers
bear fiduciary obligations in each case.593 While receivers carry out slightly different functions,594
and derive their powers mainly from a court order,595 their similarities with and judicial
comparisons to the monitor make it difficult to understand why receivers are presumed fiduciaries
and monitors’ fiduciary status appears questionable. After all, there is an ongoing debate over
whether the CCAA monitor is essentially acting as a receiver in the increasing use of the CCAA
to effect sales.596 There is another comparable fiduciary often confronted in the CCAA process—
specifically in cross-border proceedings—and that is Chapter 11’s Unsecured Creditors’
Committee (UCC).597
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(iv) Fiduciary Duty of the UCC
In Chapter 11, there is a requirement that an UCC be appointed in most cases.598 The UCC
owes a fiduciary duty, limited to its constituent members,599 and not to the debtor or overall
bankruptcy estate.600 The membership of the UCC is determined by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Trustee,601 typically consists of the seven largest claims against the debtor,602 and may shift
because creditors are able to bow out at any time.603 The UCC is given authority “both to promote
and to protect the interests of its unsecured creditor constituency.”604 With this authority, the UCC
is imbued with fiduciary obligations to its members, “defined by undivided loyalty and impartial
service to all creditors represented… [and] bound not only to serving its co-creditors, but also to
safeguarding the bankruptcy process.”605 The members of an UCC each owe fiduciary obligations
to the committee’s constituents.606 These obligations are typically only owed to other members of
a creditor’s class.607 Much like the monitor’s duty, even the appearance of a breach of fiduciary

Code, supra note 112, s 1102(a)(1); See also Moncur & White, ibid (“[w]hile not mandatory in every case, a UCC
is generally appointed in large Chapter 11 proceedings to act as an advocate of the debtor's prepetition unsecured
creditors” Moncur & White, ibid at 401).
599
Re Johns-Manville Corp, 23 BR 919 at 925 (Bankr SDNY, 1983) [Johns-Manville].
600
See e.g., Re SPM Manufacturing Corp, 984 F 2d 1305 (USCA 1st Cir 1993); Re Bohack Corp, 607 F (2d) 258 (2nd
Cir, 1979) [Re Bohack].
601
Code, supra note 112, s 1102(a)(1).
602
Ibid, s 1102(b)(1); See also Kenneth N Klee & K John Shaffer, “Creditors' Committees under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code” (1993) 44:4 SCL Rev 995 at 1006–09 (“the courts and U.S. Trustees routinely adjust the size of
creditors' committees” ibid at 1006).
603
Code, ibid, ss 1102(a)(2), 1102(a)(4). See also Michelle M Harner & Jamie Marincic, “Committee Capture - An
Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors' Committees in Business Reorganizations” (2011) 64:3 Vand L Rev 747
at 754 (“turnover of committee membership can cause instability and potentially expose the committee to further
manipulation by other creditors” ibid); See also Jason Harris, “Enhancing the Role of Creditors’ Committees in
Corporate Rescue Laws”, in J Sarra, ed, Annual Review of Insolvency Law, 2011 (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) [Retrieved
from WestlawNext Canada].
604
Klee & Shaffer, supra note 602 at 1000; Code, supra note 112, s 1103(c).
605
Mark D Gensburg, “Rogue Committees Or Rogue Judges: The Limits of a Bankruptcy Judge’s Authority to
Disband Chapter 11 Committees” (2019) 35:2 Emory Bankr Dev J 601 at 609, citing In re Fas Mart Convenience
Stores, Inc, 265 BR 427 at 432 (Bankr ED Va 2001) [Fas Mart]; Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc v Walsh,
327 BR 561 at 573 (WD Pa 2005).
606
Klee & Shaffer, supra note 602 at 1053, citing In re Map Int'l, Inc, 105 BR 5 at 6 (Bankr ED Pa 1989), In re
National Equip & Mold Corp, 33 BR 574 (Bankr ND Ohio 1983).
607
Klee & Shaffer, ibid at 1054 (see ibid, at n 237 for cases); See also Re Adelphia Communications Corp, 544 F (3d)
420 (2nd Cir 2008).
598

91

duty constitutes a breach,608 requiring the court to remove the breaching party from the
committee.609 This does not apply to the inherent conflict most stakeholders have with each other
in the event of an insolvency.610 Also like the monitor, the UCC has to balance conflicting interests,
as unsecured creditors can and do often hold divergent positions.611 Unlike the monitor and courtappointed receiver, the UCC is not an officer of the court,612 but the UCC’s representative role,
vis-à-vis its diverse creditor constituency, attracts the high standards imposed by fiduciary law.613
The UCC is intended to act as a watchdog for its members,614 investigating the debtor,615
and providing a counterbalance to the debtor and secured creditors.616 This role often requires it
to, like the monitor in the CCAA process, provide oversight of the debtor, keeping it in check. 617
To this end, the UCC actively advocates for its members’ best interests, 618 unconstrained by the
impartiality that a monitor is expected to maintain. It can also deal with the debtor in a nonadversarial way, negotiating as “an ally for the debtor in its negotiations with secured creditors
and potential postpetition lenders or purchasers.”619 The UCC’s role thus helps to protect the
interests of unsecured creditors, through the traditional adversarial role of a party to adjudication.
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609
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While it must, like the monitor, balance competing duties,620 the fact that it advocates for and holds
allegiance to a particular ‘team’ allows the UCC to better define its intended role.621 Nevertheless,
the UCC model is not without its imperfections.
The multiple and divergent unsecured creditor interests that are represented by an UCC
typically work within “a democratic process of discussion, voting, and compromise… [which] is
significantly susceptible to disagreement and delay.”622 Whether because not all members agree
on a particular action, or by virtue of changes in membership, the UCC is vulnerable to internal
dissent and delay.623 Further, given its defined interests, (i.e. to a particular group of creditors), the
UCC model is vulnerable to self-interested use, which “can skew the court’s and outside parties’
perspectives.”624 These negatives can be further compounded by virtue of their cost, vis-à-vis the
professional fees such committees incur.625 This can be especially harmful to secured creditors
“because, often, committee professionals are paid out of the cash collateral of a secured
creditor.”626 Given the trickle down effects of claims, harm to such creditors typically impacts all
creditors.627 Finally, conflicts of interest can still occur, and “[w]hen a committee breaches its
fiduciary duties, it creates an opportunity for the financial abuse of the debtor-in-possession and
negatively impacts the return to creditors.”628
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In light of the above synthesis of UCCs, it seems that, in some respects, their defined
loyalties may afford them a more tenable role as fiduciaries. However, in many ways, they may
also offer a more focused view of the conflicts of interest faced by insolvency fiduciaries generally.
(v) Conclusions Regarding Fiduciary Duties
The above sections considered the fiduciary duties of different types of professionals, such
as receivers, directors and officers, the monitor, and finally UCCs. Several conclusions can be
drawn from this discussion. Court-appointed receivers owe fiduciary obligations to all interested
parties, and are accordingly expected to remain impartial. Importantly, however, a receiver’s
impartiality, and thus its fiduciary duties, are not to unreasonably impinge on its ability to carry
out its responsibilities.629 Directors and officers likewise owe fiduciary duties that are to be
fulfilled in the best interests of the corporation. While a corporation is comprised of a variety of
divergent interests, directors are considered to be in compliance with their fiduciary obligations so
long as they have considered and balanced all relevant factors and acted in good faith.630 Directors
and officers are impartial, insofar as their fiduciary obligations require them to selflessly work
towards the objects of the corporation.631 The monitor is supposed to be impartial, but like the
court-appointed receiver, its impartiality should not prevent it from carrying out its
responsibilities.632 Likewise, recent cases have raised the question of whether the monitor is prima
facie a fiduciary, or whether such obligations only apply when the monitor is assigned certain
responsibilities by the court.633
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Finally, the UCC is composed of fiduciaries, with each member owing a fiduciary duty to
all other members.634 It owes its allegiance to its constituents, and thus may be considered impartial
insofar as it is advocating for the interests of its members. Of the four fiduciaries discussed, it is
the only one that actively advocates on behalf of a defined portion of actors, whereas receivers,
directors and officers, and monitors each work for the interests of a broader collective. Examining
these fiduciaries comparatively provides a better understanding of the different ways fiduciary
obligations are understood in the corporate law and corporate insolvency contexts. With these
examples in mind, I now turn the focus back on the monitor, and highlight solutions for addressing
its conflicting roles.
PART III – IMPROVING THE MONITOR: SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
Former Ontario Supreme Court Justice James Farley famously proposed the bifurcation of
the monitor’s role.635 He contended that “insolvency/restructuring culture changes overtime — and
sometimes very quickly.”636 In his view, the cumulative effect of these changes, particularly
CCAA amendments, is that “heavier and heavier burdens have been thrown on the role of the court
appointed officers,” especially the monitor.637 The result is that it is increasingly difficult to “truly
be objective and neutral” as a monitor in CCAA cases.638 Mr. Farley pointed to the shared history
between many of the typical players in the CCAA to highlight monitors acting so as to secure
future work as a potential conflict.639
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He proposed that the role of the monitor be divided into two: “one role… as an advisor to
the applicant debtor and to provide appropriate financial and other information[,]… [and] a
different entity to be the advisor to the court directly and therefore indirectly to all interested
parties.”640 The latter court advisor role would encompass the traditional watchdog role of the
monitor, reporting on the debtor and ensuring protection of “smaller or unorganized
stakeholders.”641 The debtor’s advisor would be appointed in the initial order, as with the current
framework,642 “with its authority and duties being to continue indefinitely to advise the debtor
applicant and provide financial and other information but only temporarily in respect of other
aspects relating to the role of the monitor” as currently understood.643 Mr. Farley’s rationale for
his proposed changes echoes Topolniski J’s statement in Winalta that the CCAA and its monitor
act as safeguards for public faith in the insolvency system.644 For Mr. Farley, the need to “keep
pace with the inevitable evolution” of the insolvency system is necessary to maintain that same
safeguard.645 Accordingly, he recommended proactive changes in the face of increasing difficulty
avoiding conflicts of interest in the monitor’s role.
Recently, Vern DaRe and Alfonso Nocilla re-examined Mr. Farley’s proposal to bifurcate
the monitor’s role.646 Briefly, they propose amendments to the CCAA aimed at mitigating conflicts
of interest at the outset: “Parliament should consider amending the CCAA to provide courts with
the express authority to bifurcate the monitor’s role when a real or apparent conflict arises.”647
DaRe and Nocilla are concerned with the growing number of duties and responsibilities imposed
640
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on the monitor. Courts increasingly rely on the monitor’s advice and expertise “when exercising
their discretion to make novel orders that extend the Act’s ambit.”648 The monitor functions as an
extension of the CCAA court’s supervisory role.649 As restructurings grow in complexity—
especially the growing tendency for CCAA cases to be creditor-driven—the monitor may find
itself overburdened with responsibilities.650 Moreover, with such growing complexity, courts may
directly, or indirectly through the monitor, become more active, thus stepping beyond their
supervisory role.651 While DaRe and Nocilla recognize that “the overwhelming evidence from the
case law is that monitors are highly ethical and skilled professionals,” their concern is that
increasing duties create endless potential for conflicts of interest.652 This is important, given that
courts have stated that even the perception of bias is sufficient to prevent the monitor from carrying
out its impartial role.653
DaRe and Nocilla’s bifurcation proposal follows Farley’s vision of a separate debtoradvisor and court-advisor appointment.654 They add that bifurcation is not a necessary practice in
all cases, suggesting that judges be provided with “a set of factors… to consider in determining
whether it would be appropriate to split the monitor’s role, appoint some other officer or even
empower a creditor’s committee,” depending on the circumstances.655 DaRe and Nocilla provide
a flexible framework for judges to use when a monitor’s role is stretched thin by the complexity
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of a restructuring, or otherwise encounters a potential conflict of interest.656 This flexibility, which
reflects a CCAA judge’s discretionary power, opens the door for increased use of alternative means
of assisting the monitor in discharging its expanded duties.657
Chapter Two of this thesis discussed one such means of easing pressure off the monitor:
the Chief Restructuring Officer (CRO), which may be appointed to provide insolvency-specific
expertise and leadership to the debtor firm.658 Like the monitor, the CRO is a court-appointed
officer, and is subject to some of the same concerns facing the monitor, such as bias and an
unsettled fiduciary duty.659 Creditors’ committees are another suggested means of taking pressure
off the monitor. These committees function similarly to the UCC in Chapter 11, in that they
represent their respective creditor constituencies.660 The CCAA does not address committees,
leaving the formation of such to the judge’s discretion, primarily under section 11.661 Committees
may be useful in especially complex restructurings, where better organization of creditor groups
can streamline negotiations and planning.662 They are especially useful in cross-border
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restructurings, where they provide a venue for better representation of Canadian unsecured creditor
groups.663 The main argument against committees in Canada is that the existence of the monitor
renders their role largely unnecessary except in rare cases.664 However, unlike the UCC in Chapter
11, Canadian ad hoc committees are generally thought to not have fiduciary duties “to similarly
situated creditors,”665 and because they “are largely self-formed and unsupervised by the Court
except on a high level, issues of governance can arise that have the potential of impeding, rather
than aiding, efficient and responsive negotiation.”666 It is no surprise then that committees are not
a common practice in CCAA cases, with the preferred alternative usually being the appointment
of representative counsel.667
A court has jurisdiction to make a representation order upon consideration of a number of
factors concerning the effect of such an order on the parties.668 In Canwest Publishing, the court
went so far as to say: “[d]esirably in my view, Canadian courts have not typically appointed an
Unsecured Creditors Committee… [but] [i]t would be of considerable benefit to both the
Applicants and the Salaried Employees and Retirees to have Representatives and representative
counsel.”669 One of the more contentious aspects of representative counsel is funding.670
Nevertheless, such costs may be a worthwhile trade-off, given their invaluable assistance with
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negotiating and strategizing, along with improving communication channels between counsels’
clients and the monitor.671 Information asymmetry is one of the more prevalent difficulties
encountered in Chapter 11, given the absence of a neutral fiduciary like the monitor.
One American Fourth Circuit justice proposes a new fiduciary for Chapter 11 that
resembles the CCAA monitor.672 Justice Harner justifies the need for a “protector” of the
bankruptcy estate on the basis of the debtor and creditors’ “self-interest and influence by outside
pressures.”673 Borrowing inspiration from Canada’s insolvency system, among others, Justice
Harner envisions “a third-party neutral appointed by the court… [a] case facilitator [who] would,
among other things, work with the DIP to gather information and explore restructuring
alternatives; provide information to the debtor's stakeholders; act as a facilitator for negotiations
among the debtor and its stakeholders; and report all relevant information to the bankruptcy court
and U.S. trustee.”674 Much like the monitor then, Harner’s case facilitator is a watchdog,
information intermediary, and facilitator of negotiations.675
Unlike the monitor, the case facilitator “would not independently assess or make
recommendations to the bankruptcy court regarding the parties’ positions or the debtor's
reorganization options.”676 The rationale is that being “asked to perform both judgemental and
facilitative functions” is more likely to result in actual or perceived conflicts.677 The case facilitator
is limited to helping the parties identify the best plan, by first ensuring they have access to
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necessary information, and then by reviewing proposed plans.678 The goal is to mitigate the effect
of parties’ self-serving actions, address the information asymmetry of Chapter 11 cases, and
ultimately “[facilitate] more meaningful, objective and efficient dialogue among the parties.”679
The bottom line for Harner’s proposal is to shift restructuring under Chapter 11 towards mediation
and alternative dispute resolution, and away from overly adversarial litigation.680 These laudable
objectives are also in line with the CCAA’s various objectives, such that Justice Harner’s case
facilitator provides some ready lessons for re-envisioning the CCAA monitor.
PART IV – PROPOSAL
The monitor has long been held to owe a fiduciary duty to all stakeholders in the CCAA
process. At least some of the stakeholders in a typical CCAA proceeding will hold positions at
odds with others. The monitor will also have pre-existing relationships, with the debtor and often
many of the creditors as well. There may be especially heavy pressure to pursue a sale or
liquidation, over a restructuring. The monitor may be working on a restructuring plan, while
actively soliciting sales. It will ultimately recommend to the court the option which it finds most
viable. This decision will necessarily benefit some stakeholders to the detriment of others. How
can such an outcome be reconciled with the monitor’s duty to act in the best interests of each
stakeholder?
Two authors summarize the tension in Canadian insolvency law: “[a] fundamental
principle in Canada with respect to the appointment of a monitor and/or receiver is the balancing
of efficiency and cost-saving with the desire and requirement to ensure an insolvency officer is
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free of conflict, can act independently and is not subject to undue influence.”681 The fiduciary
aspect of the monitor’s role requires careful attention. It provides the strongest protection against
conflict of interest by holding the monitor to the highest standard. When coupled with its general
and specific duties of good faith,682 along with the rules of professional conduct for insolvency
professionals,683 it is expected that monitors will be careful, neutral, and independent. However,
“[f]iduciaries can and do act in multiple capacities and they are not necessarily fiduciaries in each
capacity, or indeed a fiduciary for all purposes.”684 This malleability, referred to by various
courts,685 leaves a hole in the armour of a court-appointed officer whose role as neutral watchdog
symbolizes protection of public confidence in the insolvency system.686
While committees and representative counsel may ease the pressure on the monitor,
improving the flow of communication and negotiations, they do nothing to address the monitor’s
independence. The monitor carries a “duty to ensure that no creditor has an advantage over
another.”687 Even skillfully organized stakeholders may still be favoured over others, particularly
if they are able to present a united front. Bifurcation of the role is one feasible solution, because it
provides a means of neatly divvying up contentious tasks, providing all stakeholders with its
intended watchdog functions, without detracting from the need to have an advisor for the debtor.
Yet the bifurcation proposal suggests one role owing duties—and thus loyalties—to the debtor,

681

Dietrich & Prince, supra note 400.
CCAA, supra note 2, ss 18.6, 25.
683
CAIRP, supra note 487.
684
Harris, supra note 603.
685
Urbancorp, supra note 443 at paras 18, 22; Essar, supra note 306 at para 119, citing Ivaco, supra note 470 at paras
49–53; Re 1231640 Ontario Inc, supra note 473 at para 51.
686
Nelson, supra note 315 at para 37, citing Winalta, supra note 10 at para 82.
687
Winalta, supra note 10 at para 77 (“[a] recurring theme found in the case law is that the monitor’s duty is to ensure
that no creditor has an advantage over another (see Siscoe & Savoie v. Royal Bank of Canada (1994), 29 C.B.R. (3d)
1 at 8 (N.B.C.A.); Re Laidlaw Inc. (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 72 at para. 2 (Ont. S.C.J.); Re United Used Auto & Truck
Parts Ltd. (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 144 at para. 20 (B.C.S.C.); and Re 843504 Alberta Ltd., 2003 ABQB 1015 at para.
19, 351 A.R. 223)” ibid).
682

102

and another to the court and stakeholders. This does not entirely address the potential for bias, and
the weak safeguards on independence.
I propose the imposition of a new duty on the monitor to the CCAA process itself, which
duty would consist of the following undertakings: (1) to consider and balance all stakeholder
interests; and (2) to produce the best possible result in line with the CCAA’s objectives. These
requirements echo the court’s statement in Urbancorp,688 to the effect that the monitor’s neutrality
is not required if it prevents the monitor from pursuing CCAA goals. 689 Recall that the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Essar also recognized that the monitor will be at odds with stakeholders because
of its investigation of the debtor’s finances,690 and will step outside neutrality to take positions
only when they accord with a restructuring purpose.691 The Supreme Court of Canada has
summarized the CCAA’s objectives as follows:
[41]
Among these objectives, the CCAA generally prioritizes “avoiding the social and
economic losses resulting from liquidation of an insolvent company” (Century Services, at
para. 70). As a result, the typical CCAA case has historically involved an attempt to
facilitate the reorganization and survival of the pre-filing debtor company in an operational
state — that is, as a going concern. Where such a reorganization was not possible, the
alternative course of action was seen as a liquidation through either a receivership or under
the BIA regime. This is precisely the outcome that was sought in Century Services (see
para. 14).
[42]
That said, the CCAA is fundamentally insolvency legislation, and thus it also “has
the simultaneous objectives of maximizing creditor recovery, preservation of goingconcern value where possible, preservation of jobs and communities affected by the firm’s
financial distress . . . and enhancement of the credit system generally” (Sarra, Rescue! The
Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, at p. 14; see also Ernst & Young Inc. v. Essar
Global Fund Ltd., 2017 ONCA 1014, 139 O.R. (3d) 1, at para. 103). In pursuit of those
objectives, CCAA proceedings have evolved to permit outcomes that do not result in the
emergence of the pre-filing debtor company in a restructured state, but rather involve some
form of liquidation of the debtor’s assets under the auspices of the Act itself (Sarra, “The
Oscillating Pendulum: Canada’s Sesquicentennial and Finding the Equilibrium for
Insolvency Law”, at pp. 19-21).692
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There are likely to be many varying interests in any given CCAA case. As observed above,
the CCAA’s flexibility permits pursuit of a range of options. At one end of the spectrum lies a
traditional restructuring, while at the other a liquidation of the debtor’s business assets.693 There
are many potential permutations in between these two different outcomes.694 All stakeholder
interests, i.e. desired outcomes, can be plotted along this spectrum. A duty owed to the process,
pursuant to the CCAA objectives, allows the monitor to chart the course of a CCAA case according
to a position on that spectrum. Once the monitor’s recommended course of action has been
approved by the court and requisite stakeholders, the monitor can then pursue this chosen course
in the best interests of all stakeholders. The duty to the process operates as a duty owed to the
court; it provides an additional layer of protection, and codifies the monitor’s allegiance to the
CCAA’s objectives. In other words, the best interests of the stakeholders as a collective are the
baseline for decision-making at two levels: (1) the process of considering and deciding on a plan,
and (2) the implementation of the plan. The CCAA is fundamentally about making compromises.
A plan will necessarily benefit some parties more than others. So long as that plan is reached after
a careful balancing of the various stakeholder interests, adhering to CCAA objectives, the process
will bear the necessary hallmarks of fairness and transparency. Once a viable plan is fairly selected,
the “best interests of the collective” will be defined by how best to balance claims with the chosen
course of action.
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It remains open to CCAA judges to consider parties’ requests for representation orders,
and recognition of unofficial committees. Though such decisions are highly context-specific, the
complexities of a given case may make such orders necessary. These are both ways to also provide
stakeholders with the ability to present an organized front, which additionally may make the
monitor’s task easier. This is especially true in cases involving super monitors and cross-border
proceedings, because: “like other fiduciaries, monitors cannot reasonably take on too many duties
to different parties whose interests may be, or may become, adverse.”695 Stakeholders in a CCAA
case typically play an adversarial role,696 each advocating for their own view of a just outcome.697
Encouraging this adversarial role allows the parties to drive the process, which prevents the court
or its monitor from stepping beyond supervision and adjudication, into administration.698 The
court’s role as referee remains “to ensure that it is a fair and reasonable process.” 699 This can be
bolstered by the monitor’s role so long as its focus is on balancing competing interests and
safeguarding the fairness of the process.700 This can be achieved by the duty owed to the process.
The cornerstone of the CCAA regime is its integrity; the monitor is a natural reflection of
the need to protect that integrity, acting as guardian of the process.701 Courts and monitors each
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have duties to uphold public confidence in the regime. The CAIRP Rules of Professional Conduct,
to which monitors are subject, state as their first principle: “[m]embers conduct themselves at all
times in a manner that maintains the good reputation of the profession and serves the public
interest.”702 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Olympia & York Developments Ltd v Royal
Trust Co703 summarized the court’s role as follows:
[fairness] is the quintessential expression of the court’s equitable jurisdiction -- although
the jurisdiction is statutory, the broad discretionary powers given to the judiciary by the
legislation make its exercise an exercise in equity -- and “reasonableness” is what lends
objectivity to the process… What is “fair and reasonable”, then, must be assessed in the
context of the impact of the plan on the creditors and the various classes of creditors, in the
context of their response to the plan, and with a view to the purpose of the CCAA.704

The court in Olympia stresses the role of the court as arbiter of fairness in the CCAA process.
Recall that “the architecture of the CCAA leaves the case-specific assessment and balancing of
these remedial objectives to the supervising judge.”705 The judge supervises negotiations, often
through the monitor, while also supervising the monitor itself.706 On the other hand, “[t]he monitor
is to be independent and impartial, must treat all parties reasonably and fairly, and is to conduct
itself in a manner consistent with the objectives of the CCAA and its restructuring purpose.”707 It
is ultimately the court’s role to supervise, and also oversee the balancing of the multiple objectives
of the CCAA regime and the interests of each particular case.708 The duty to the process, under the
CCAA’s objectives, allows the court to better instruct and manage the monitor, while also
clarifying its status as fiduciary.
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The Ontario Court of Appeal stated that “a monitor is not necessarily a fiduciary; it only
becomes one if the court specifically assigns it a responsibility to which fiduciary duties attach.”709
Under my proposal, the monitor would be a prima facie fiduciary per its duty to the process, best
understood as a duty to the court. This follows the understanding of the monitor’s fiduciary duty
prior to Essar, and affords parties with remedies for breach of fiduciary duty at equity. Moreover,
while not every action undertaken by the monitor carries the obligations of a fiduciary, 710 the
essence of the role vis-à-vis its reporting and advisory functions suggests that the analysis in Essar
should not be taken to say the monitor is not a fiduciary by default. It would be rare for the monitor
to not disseminate information, report on the debtor’s finances, or provide an opinion on a
particular course of action, all of which directly affect stakeholders’ interests.711 This is illustrated
by explaining how my proposal addresses the issue of the monitor resolving competing demands
of each stakeholder. In essence, the imposition of the duty to the process, beholden to the CCAA
objectives, allows the monitor to select an action, (i.e., giving its advice to the debtor or
recommendation to the court), most in line with a CCAA objective. So long as the monitor
safeguards the fairness of the process—in pursuit of CCAA objectives—the focus extends beyond
individual stakeholders.712 If any stakeholder is dissatisfied, it will be up to a court to determine
whether there has been any unfairness, whether a CCAA objective was pursued, and finally
whether the stakeholder was fairly and reasonably considered. Applying the mechanics of
fiduciary obligations to the monitor helps to better understand the proposal.
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Fiduciary law provides the basic indicia for determining whether a fiduciary duty is owed
by one party to another. The CCAA court heavily relies upon the monitor,713 such that the
monitor’s opinions and recommendations almost invariably affect the outcome of a
restructuring.714 This is the second element of an ad hoc fiduciary duty, i.e., that “the duty must be
owed to a defined person or class of persons who must be vulnerable to the fiduciary in the sense
that the fiduciary has a discretionary power over them.”715 It is hard to argue that the weight of the
monitor’s reports does not connote discretionary power over the stakeholders.716 The first element
is the “undertaking of responsibility to act in the best interests of a beneficiary,”717 which is a staple
of the monitor’s role.718 This is, however, the part of the fiduciary analysis which is unsettled with
respect to the monitor.719 The Supreme Court of Canada in Galambos stated that: “[r]elevant to
the enquiry of whether there is such an implied undertaking are considerations such as professional
norms, industry or other common practices.”720 Accordingly, there is a strong case for an implied
undertaking, given the high standards imposed on insolvency professionals by CAIRP, the
monitor’s status as a court-appointed officer, its role as protector of the public faith in the CCAA
regime, and its similarity to the BIA receiver.721 The Supreme Court of Canada in Hodgkinson also
stressed that “where a fiduciary duty is claimed in the context of a financial advisory relationship,
it is at all events a question of fact as to whether the parties' relationship was such as to give rise
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to a fiduciary duty on the part of the advisor.”722 The final element is “that the alleged fiduciary's
power may affect the legal or substantial practical interests of the beneficiary.” 723 As with the
second element, the monitor’s influence over the CCAA process most likely satisfies the need for
its discretion to affect stakeholders’ interests.
A duty to the process clarifies that the monitor is a fiduciary from the moment of its
appointment.724 This cements the monitor’s role as guardian of public confidence in the CCAA,725
by subjecting it to the high standards of fiduciary obligations. Importantly, the duty to the process
also helps to alleviate the tension inherent where a fiduciary owes duties to two conflicting
parties.726 The monitor’s duty to the process can be understood as “instructions” from the client to
ensure a fair determination of which outcome to pursue,727 beholden to the high standard of a
fiduciary to avoid conflict of interest. Like the duty of directors and officers under Canadian
corporate law, the monitor’s duty to the process is about fairly balancing the interests of the
stakeholder collective to reach the best outcome under CCAA objectives. Put another way, it could
be said that the duty is owed to the court and held in the best interests of the CCAA’s objectives,
in the context of the particular case at hand.
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PART V – CONCLUSION
The monitor is both a symbol and a champion of the CCAA process. It acts as an extension
of the court’s supervisory capacity, serves a quasi-mediator function, disseminates key
information, and is crucial to the approval and implementation of a restructuring plan. Scholars
and courts have commented on the nature of the monitor’s neutrality since the monitor’s inception.
This discussion has culminated in questions over whether the monitor is, or can be, truly a
fiduciary. This Chapter has explored the fundamentals of fiduciary law in Canada, and has
compared the Canadian and U.S. approaches to this area. This analysis demonstrates the
complexity of fiduciary law and fiduciary relationships in Canada. In the context of CCAA
restructuring, it is clear that the monitor cannot possibly satisfy the individual whims of each
stakeholder. What the monitor can do, however, is seek to resolve the various competing claims
of different stakeholders through the CCAA process, and in a manner that is fair and reasonable to
all stakeholders.
Anchoring the monitor’s role in a duty owed to the CCAA process itself, rather than to any
particular stakeholder, will help to clarify the monitor’s role as an impartial court-appointed officer
with multiple, overarching duties. Equity provides an avenue for the pursuit of traditional remedies
for breach of fiduciary duty. This duty ensures that the monitor is independent but unrestrained by
independence so that it can assist the court and the stakeholders in fairly formulating a plan in
accordance with the objectives of the CCAA. My proposal seeks to follow the trend in the CCAA
of codifying judicial practices,728 and to firmly entrench the duty most vital to the monitor’s
independence within the legislation. This will promote greater certainty in the legislative scheme,
thus assisting the monitor in its role as bulwark for public confidence in the Canadian insolvency
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system.729 The following Chapter addresses the implementation of the proposed duties, suggests
language for codification, summarizes the project, and addresses arguments against the proposal.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Introduction
The preceding Chapters laid the groundwork for understanding insolvency law, centering
on the CCAA,730 and one of the most integral aspects of the CCAA: the monitor. This Chapter
provides a conclusion to this study of the monitor and its fiduciary duty. Part I begins with a
synthesis of the preceding three Chapters. Part II provides a breakdown of how the proposal should
be implemented, including suggested language for codification. Part III addresses weaknesses of
and anticipated arguments against the proposal. Part IV concludes with summary remarks about
the impact of this project on the literature.
PART I – TYING IT ALL TOGETHER
Chapter One concluded that the CCAA consists of a series of objectives, all of which must
be balanced and prioritized according to the circumstances of each particular case.731 This has
encouraged a flexible process in which parties can attempt to sort through the treacherous waters
of insolvency. This is also why the role of the CCAA court is supervisory in nature.732 In this way,
the CCAA recognizes that insolvency law is not one size fits all,733 and leaves it to the players and
the supervising judge to determine the best path to success. Chapter One demonstrated that in
many ways the balancing of objectives within the CCAA is reflected in attempts by stakeholders
to lobby in legislatures and especially courts,734 using their particular flavour of insolvency theory
or CCAA objective to gain more influence or protection in the process. The most prominent of
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these groups, historically, has been secured creditors.735 This understanding informs the present
project in two ways.
First, because it is courts that have enumerated the multiple objectives of the CCAA,736
which the legislative text lacks. This finds a ready parallel in the monitor, itself a product of judicial
ingenuity, subsequently codified after almost a decade of its successful deployment by judges.737
Second, because the monitor plays a crucial role in the ultimate decisions which resolve a CCAA
case. This means the monitor’s assessment of a plan, and subsequent opinion and advice as
provided to the court and the debtor, necessarily accounts for the CCAA’s objectives. The current
project argues that the monitor should have a duty to safeguard the fairness of the CCAA process,
beholden to the multiple CCAA objectives. In other words, this project contends that the next step
in the evolution of the CCAA and its monitor is to put into legislation what judges have been
saying for decades.738 This is especially relevant because while insolvency legislation is the chosen
response to the collective action problem, it shifts some responsibility for avoiding that problem
to the supervising judge and its appointed officer. The concern today is that the monitor is pulled
in different directions by the different elements of the collective, to the point of actual or perceived
conflict of interest.
Chapter Two retraced the monitor’s history, from inception to its current iteration. The
complexity of restructurings compelled the courts to create an extension of its supervisory
authority in the monitor.739 Chapter Two outlined how the balancing of the CCAA’s multiple
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objectives arises in every aspect of the monitor’s role. It is both the eyes and ears of the court, and
the symbol of fairness in the CCAA process. To take on the role of impartial officer in the midst
of numerous, divergent interests is difficult at best. The pressures and stakes of a CCAA
proceeding weigh on the monitor’s role, as it must consider all options and ultimately give its
advice and opinion thereon.
Chapter Two exposed the main concerns in the monitor’s role: its malleable neutrality and
unclear status as fiduciary. A review of the jurisprudence, reveals a significant gap in the
understanding of the source of the monitor’s independence and its safeguards. This is especially
so given that its strongest source of independence, its status as fiduciary, has not been conclusively
defined or even determined to be a necessary component of the role. Chapter Two is especially
important to the current project because its examination of the caselaw reveals that, besides three
statements by the Ontario Court of Appeal,740 CCAA courts across Canada have treated the
monitor as a fiduciary, owing fiduciary duties to all stakeholders. Likewise, Chapter Two served
to highlight the many instances in which a monitor may encounter actual or perceived conflicts of
interest. These included: a pre-existing relationship between the monitor and debtor, the monitor’s
responsibility to guide the debtor through a restructuring, the practice of pursuing a restructuring
while simultaneously soliciting sales, persuasion of the monitor by strong stakeholders, its
malleable neutrality, and its indeterminately defined fiduciary duty. Whereas Chapter Two
explained the role and the gaps therein, Chapter Three focused on its unclear fiduciary duty as the
most promising solution to concerns over the role.
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Chapter Three presented an overview of Canadian fiduciary doctrine. Then it examined a
variety of fiduciaries in the corporate and insolvency law contexts, before applying these
observations to the monitor. Whereas Chapter Two outlined the instances of conflict of interest in
the monitor’s role, Chapter Three argued these conflicts are precisely why it is important to cement
the role of the monitor in a way that recognizes its independence. A fiduciary duty is defined by
the high standards of good faith, loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness.741 Legislative recognition
that the monitor is a fiduciary and a guarantor of fairness in the CCAA holds the monitor to the
highest possible standard in every case, communicating through codified language the importance
of independence for the role. After all, the monitor fulfills a role whose purpose is to protect public
confidence in the CCAA scheme.742
Such confidence also comes from greater certainty in the legislative scheme. Chapter Three
demonstrates the need for certainty with regards to the monitor’s fiduciary duty. The means of
providing that certainty lies in this dissertation’s proposal for codification. By making the monitor
a fiduciary by default, tasked with balancing the CCAA’s multiple objectives with the best interests
of the stakeholder collective, each case can produce an outcome that is in keeping with the spirit
of the legislation. While the ultimate authority is always the court, Chapter Three clarified that the
proposed fiduciary duty (set out below) serves to make a court’s job easier. That is, codification
allows a judge to more easily configure and then supervise the monitor, ensuring fair treatment of
both individual stakeholders and the collective as a whole.
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PART II – IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSAL
The CCAA has historically evolved incrementally as a result of judicial decisions.743 Its
inception as a skeletal legislative scheme encouraged judges to exercise their discretion, both
inherent and that afforded them by section 11 of the CCAA, to develop the law in accordance with
changes in business and restructuring practice.744 This approach has functioned thus far because
the flexibility of the legislation and the broad discretionary powers of CCAA judges encourage
creative solutions even in especially complex cases.745 One of the main areas lacking a clear
statement on the law is the monitor’s duty or duties, particularly its fiduciary obligations.746 As
observed in Chapters Two and Three, this position has never been as unclear as it is now.747
Accordingly, it would fall short of the purpose of a proposal aimed at providing clarity and
consistency to suggest its implementation through the courts.
The proposed duty to the process should be codified in the CCAA. In Chapter Three, I
drew a comparison with the corporate law fiduciary duty of directors and officers, which is found
in every corporate law statute in Canada. My proposed duty to the process would be similarly
codified, and would be worded as follows:
The monitor, in exercising its powers and discharging its duties, shall
(a) act as a fiduciary, in the interest of safeguarding the fairness of the process by pursuing
the most reasonable outcome according to the objectives of this Act, in the best interest of
the stakeholder collective; and
(b) in the event of a conflict of interest on the part of the monitor, the court will consider
whether the monitor’s actions were undertaken in pursuit of a valid CCAA objective,
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failing which such actions constitute a breach of the duty in (a), giving rise to the traditional
equitable remedies afforded by fiduciary law to individual stakeholders.

The codification of this duty accords with one of the fundamental purposes of the monitor: to act
as a safeguard of public confidence in the Canadian insolvency law system. By being able to point
to the legislation, the monitor’s fiduciary duty and its independence are thereby grounded as
essential elements of the CCAA process. Moreover, an unintended but positive effect of this
codification would be to incorporate by reference the CCAA’s objectives, which currently reside
in judicial pronouncements and academic texts and not in the legislation.748
PART III – ADDRESSING WEAKNESSES
(i) Being Proactive
One question that is likely to be raised in light of this proposal is whether changes to the
monitor’s role are even necessary at this time. After all, there have only been two cases of
reprimand or removal historically,749 and monitors are typically found to be ethical, effective, and
professional.750 The simple answer to this question is that it is best to be proactive. Concerns about
the credibility of monitors endanger public confidence in the insolvency system.751 Much has been
written about the problems faced by monitors, particularly as concerns their receiver-like role in
the increasing use of the CCAA to effect sales.752 When coupled with the unclear status of their
neutrality and fiduciary duty, there arises a need to provide a clear basis on which to base their
impartiality and role as champion of the CCAA’s objectives.
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The current framework combines the requirement in the CCAA that the monitor act in good
faith in performing its duties,753 with the CAIRP rules of conduct for insolvency professionals.754
Good faith is imposed on all parties, and does not answer questions of monitor independence. The
CAIRP rules stipulate that at a minimum, acceptable conduct consists of: acting in a manner that
serves the public interest, avoiding actual or perceived conflict of interest, and remaining “free of
any influence… which impairs their professional judgement or objectivity.”755 Although helpful,
these rules summarize what is already expected of monitors in the caselaw, and do nothing to
ground or clarify a standard of independence. The proposal necessarily incorporates these
minimum standards, and provides an indelible statement on monitor independence.
(ii) Alternative Approaches
In Chapter Three, I highlighted some of the suggested means of taking pressure off the
monitor or changing its role to address inherent and potential conflicts. These included bifurcation
of the monitor’s role,756 appointment of a CRO,757 appointment of creditor committees,758
representation orders,759 as well as American commentary on what an insolvency fiduciary should
look like.760 In light of such well-argued proposals, the current proposal needs to state why it
provides a more favourable response. The short answer is that a codified duty to the process, in
the best interests of the stakeholder collective, is the only suggestion thus far that directly addresses
the status of the monitor as fiduciary. By so doing, this proposal also goes to the heart of the
monitor’s independence. As observed in Chapter Three, fiduciary obligations carry the highest

753

CCAA, supra note 2, s 25.
CAIRP, supra note 487.
755
Ibid.
756
Farley, supra note 635; DaRe & Nocilla, supra note 338 at 226 [emphasis in original].
757
See Sarra, “Rescue”, supra note 4 at 350.
758
Chadwick & Bulas, supra note 660.
759
Ibid.
760
Harner, supra note 672.
754

118

standards imposed by the law, and require nothing short of utmost good faith and diligence.761
While bifurcation of the role may ease the workload of the monitor in certain instances, and
provide better optics vis-à-vis separate advisory responsibilities, either or both of these new roles
may or may not be a fiduciary under current caselaw. In other words, separating the roles may just
lead to two separate potentials for conflicts of interest, as opposed to one, while still lacking a
firmly grounded basis for independence.
As for the many other means of providing organization and voice for stakeholders, (i.e.,
committees and representation orders), the same question of independence remains. Better means
of communication and information sharing do not, on their own, decrease the risk of influence on
the monitor. If anything, they may increase such a risk, by providing avenues through which
concerted efforts to influence the monitor can be exercised.
These proposals are not to be discarded. They still raise important points, and offer ways
to address gaps in a very complex process. Bifurcation and the various means of organizing
creditors are to be considered as supplementary to this proposal. The core of the monitor’s role is
to be its fiduciary duty as codified. From this starting point, it is open to the courts to adopt such
strategies depending on the circumstances of each particular case.
(iii) Likelihood of Implementation
In the law and economics literature, a Pareto Efficiency describes an efficient change as
one which leaves at least one party better while not causing detriment to any others. 762 Another
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way to state this, and one more pertinent to the CCAA, is that “[u]nfairness resides where only
some face these risks, [i.e., of uncertainty,] while others actually benefit from the situation.”763
One important question raised by any proposal for change is whether it is efficient or fair in this
manner. Chapter One highlighted the historic superior position of strong creditors, particularly
secured creditors, in the CCAA process.764 Accordingly, another way to ask the above question is
to ask whether this proposal so disturbs the status quo that it might encounter insurmountable
obstacles, such as lack of political will or strong lobbying efforts, against its implementation.765
This proposal is primarily about fairness, and one of its principal guardians in the CCAA:
the monitor. Better protection and understanding of the monitor’s independence provide greater
assurance of fairness in the CCAA process.766 This is especially helpful for unsecured creditors,
because they can point to a duty that requires their interests to be taken into account and balanced
alongside the CCAA’s objectives. Secured creditors are still going to be the most powerful players.
This is because of the nature of their credit arrangement, which this proposal does not alter. The
goal of the proposal is to curb influence on the monitor, by establishing its impartiality, balanced
with the need to pursue valid CCAA objectives, through codification. Accordingly, weaker parties
are better protected, and the strongest parties have not had their positions tarnished. In this regard,
the proposal is both fair and efficient because it does not single any one party or group out.
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(iv) Judicial Response
One of the central supports for this proposal is that it is merely following the flow of CCAA
evolutionary history: codifying the practices of judges.767 As discussed in Chapters Two and Three,
there is a long line of cases that consider the monitor a fiduciary. 768 Similarly, the duty to the
process reflects judicial statement that a monitor is first and foremost beholden to the CCAA
process, its objectives and purposes, and by meeting this qualification it can take a position that
would otherwise seem biased.769 The proposal conceptualizes this fiduciary duty, as expressed in
judgments over time. One might ask how judges have historically responded to similar
codification. The most recent example of this lies in section 18.6, the CCAA duty of good faith,
enacted in 2019.770 This provision has not met with resistance by the judiciary,771 despite
commentary by academics that its usefulness and meaning are unclear.772 It should be noted that
one of the main issues with section 18.6 is that “good faith” is not defined in the CCAA.773 The
current project’s proposal does not face a similar issue because its principal goal is to add certainty
to the regime as a whole by defining the monitor’s fiduciary status. This raises the question of
whether this certainty is misdirected, given that courts already act as guardians of the fairness of
the CCAA process.
In other words, does not a CCAA judge already consider whether a plan is in pursuit of a
valid CCAA objective? It is important to note that the proposal does not fetter the court’s
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discretion. The proposal clarifies the monitor’s role by cementing its independence, and adherence
to fairness and the CCAA’s objectives. As accounting and insolvency experts, monitors’ reports
are afforded significant respect by CCAA courts.774 The integrity of a monitor’s decision-making
is protected by the imposition of fiduciary obligations, which is similar to the respect of the
business judgment of directors and officers by courts in Canadian corporate law.775 As the eyes
and ears of the court, the monitor is an extension of the court’s supervisory authority. 776 All of a
monitor’s other duties are already codified in section 23,777 except the most important one: its
fiduciary duty. By codifying its fiduciary obligations, the monitor’s reports to the court and
guidance to the debtor are qualified by these high standards. This more clearly defines the
relationship between CCAA courts and monitors, and makes for better understanding of the aims
of the role.
PART IV – CONCLUSION
In these four Chapters, I have analysed the role of the monitor and its broader significance
to Canadian insolvency law. A review of the cases and commentary since the first use of the term
“monitor” in CCAA proceedings reveals the success of this creature of judicial creativity.
Nevertheless, a pragmatic approach to this rapidly evolving area of the law reveals a tendency
towards complexity and conflicts of interest. In order to provide a response to concerns over
credibility and transparency in the CCAA process, it is proposed that the legislation proactively
recognize the monitor as a fiduciary. This proposal firmly entrenches the role of the monitor as
bulwark of public confidence in the CCAA regime, and additionally provides codified recognition
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of the role of the CCAA’s multiple objectives within the decision-making process. This change
does not require a major legislative reform, nor does it change the relative positions of parties to
the CCAA process. What it does is provide a means for assessing whether a CCAA case has been
conducted in accordance with the objectives of the legislation, appropriately balanced, and whether
the monitor’s actions were undertaken in pursuit thereof.
This introduces some objectivity into the necessary deviations from absolute neutrality that
monitors will naturally encounter. With multiple, divergent interests at stake, a monitor’s ultimate
analysis will result in recommendation of a plan that is necessarily undesirable to some parties, in
relative terms. In order to ensure that the negotiating and decision-making that led to such opinions
and recommendations is free of bias, stakeholders will be able to point to a duty that requires the
monitor to fairly balance CCAA objectives in rendering its advice to the court. By proactively
addressing the perception or actual occurrence of bias in the monitor’s role, this proposal seeks to
reinforce the essential elements of the Canadian restructuring regime, best articulated by the
Honorable James Farley:
We should recall that our restructuring regime is based upon the collective action of a supermajority
of creditors exercised in a fair and reasonable way in an exercise of corporate democracy — not in
a dictatorship of special interests. 778

778

Supra note 635 at 59.
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